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Abstract 
 In moral psychology, moral identity has been viewed as a central explanatory 
construct in moral development linking morality and action. However, less is known 
about its development across the lifespan. The present dissertation aimed to address the 
limitations of previous research by using the personological approach to better 
understand how the multifaceted construct of moral identity develops from the 
understudied period of middle childhood to adolescence. The dissertation is separated 
into three chapters that can be considered as three research topics framed within one 
study tapping into the different layers of moral identity (see Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). 
All chapters were derived from the same sample of 190 participants (101 females, 
M=13.00 years, SD=2.58) from three age groups of approximately equal size: middle 
childhood (Grades 4-5; n=65), early adolescence (Grades 7-8; n=68), and mid-
adolescence (Grades 10-11; n=57). 
 The first chapter examined the self-importance and context-specificity of moral 
values (trait layer of moral identity). Age-related patterns were found on this layer of 
moral identity and parental support was a positive predictor of moral identity. The second 
chapter focused on moral identity motivation (characteristic adaptations layer of moral 
identity) and as expected, moral identity motivation varied by both age and social 
context, and was also predictive of moral behaviour. The third chapter focused on 
narrative accounts of past morally relevant behaviour (narrative layer of moral identity). 
Results revealed meaningful asymmetries in participants’ experiences and interpretations 
of past (im)moral action that varied by age and context.  
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 Overall, the present dissertation demonstrated the utility of the personological 
approach to moral identity development with each layer of moral identity manifesting 
differentially throughout the lifespan. Importantly, the dissertation provided evidence that 
moral identity development is context-dependent, begins to emerge in middle childhood 
perhaps as a social moral identity, and progresses to be more autonomous with age. 
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Moral Identity Development Across Middle Childhood and Adolescence 
 
Morality is inherent in human interaction and one can expect morality to guide 
some of our actions at any point in development (Nucci, 2004). Generally, morality 
involves understanding others’ needs, interests, and desires while relating them to one’s 
own, as well as expecting the responses of others (e.g., disapproval) to one’s own 
behaviour (Thompson, Meyer, & McGinley, 2006). There are, nonetheless, differing 
views of what morality entails, especially in terms of what makes an action “moral” 
rather than simply a conventional or personal issue. Both Elliot Turiel (1983) and 
Jonathan Haidt (2012) have proposed leading definitions that have been challenged. From 
Turiel’s perspective, the moral domain entails actions that are harmful to others and are 
universally judged as wrong. Haidt, on the other hand, proposed five moral foundations – 
care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity – based on adaptive challenges humans 
have faced in their evolutionary history and triggered by emotions such as sympathy, 
anger, and disgust. Individuals and cultures seem to differ in the degree to which they 
endorse loyalty, authority, and sanctity as well-defined moral foundations (e.g., Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2007, 2012). For example, Eastern participants showed 
stronger concerns for loyalty, sanctity and authority compared to Western participants 
(Haidt, 2007), while Liberals greatly endorse care and fairness whereas Conservatives 
endorse all five moral foundations more equally (Graham et al., 2009). Moreover, in a 
recent study, Jia, Krettenauer, & Li (in press), revealed that there are indeed culturally 
specific moral attributes for Western (i.e., Canadian) versus Eastern (i.e., Chinese) 
participants, but there are also shared moral attributes across both cultures. Morality has 
universal components such that regardless of political orientation and cultural 
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background, both caring for others and fairness are core moral foundations that lie at the 
center of the moral domain for all (Jia et al., in press; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). Beyond 
defining morality itself, an important aim of research in moral psychology is to 
understand the relationship between morality and action. 
In the beginning of the 20th century, Sigmund Freud’s (1935) psychoanalytic 
theory greatly influenced the study of human development and proposed that morality, 
specifically moral values, are transmitted entirely from parents to their children and thus 
placed very little autonomy on children themselves. In the latter half of the 20th century, 
Lawrence Kohlberg (1976) introduced his stage theory of moral development, which 
placed emphasis on moral reasoning and moral judgment or rationality at the centre of 
moral development and functioning. His stage theory was highly influential and 
transformed the direction of the field to focus on moral reasoning as the predictor of 
moral behaviour. Over the years, there were numerous criticisms of Kohlberg’s stage 
theory given evidence suggesting that moral reasoning alone is not a strong predictor of 
moral action (e.g., Blasi, 1983). Evidently, this led to new directions in moral 
development theory and research to understand how moral reasoning leads to moral 
action. In particular, Augusto Blasi (1983) introduced his self-model of moral functioning 
and argued that moral identity is a major factor in bridging the gap between moral 
judgment and action. 
Moral Identity: What Is It? 
 
Moral identity, defined as “the degree to which being a moral person is important 
to an individual's identity" (Hardy & Carlo, 2011b, p. 212), has been a central 
explanatory construct in moral development for several decades linking morality and 
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action. The central premise of Blasi’s (1983) model of moral functioning is that if an 
individual views moral values (e.g., honest, caring, fair) as fundamental to their sense of 
self then they would be considered to have a strong moral identity, which would then lead 
to moral behaviour. Recently, Hertz and Krettenauer (2016) conducted a meta-analysis to 
examine the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour from over one 
hundred articles. They found a positive overall effect size suggesting that moral identity 
is indeed related to moral behaviour. The moral identity construct is arguably a key 
personality characteristic and a developmental construct subject to individual 
development as well as an important element of positive development and everyday 
moral functioning (e.g., Damon, 2004, 2006; Hardy & Carlo, 2005, 2011b). In fact, 
Lapsley and Lasky (2001) stated, “The formation of moral identity is the clear goal of 
both moral and identity development and these two developmental tracks are ideally 
conjoined in the moral personality” (p. 358). As such, over the last few decades, the 
construct has received considerable empirical interest with investigations on the construct 
and its development. However, reliable empirical evidence supporting moral identity 
development is limited (see Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015).  
The surge in research on the moral identity construct began in the early 1980s 
when Blasi (1980, 1983, 1984) published a series of papers that sparked a new 
perspective in moral psychology. Blasi introduced the notion of moral self and identity at 
a time when cognitive aspects of moral development were dominating the field; his 
model posits the concept of moral identity as a bridge over the “moral judgment-action 
gap” and thus central to understanding moral development. More specifically, he argued 
that in order for moral judgment to lead to moral action, an individual’s moral values 
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must be embedded into their sense of self and internalized as part of their moral identity 
(Blasi, 1983). Since then, hundreds of published articles have built on the work of Blasi 
and the field of moral psychology began to transition its focus from moral reasoning to 
the moral self in childhood and moral identity in adolescence and beyond. At the same 
time, scholars were also addressing a major limitation of Blasi’s model: the lack of an 
empirical paradigm (Walker, 2014). In an overview chapter, Walker (2014) has 
characterized three major overarching approaches used in the moral psychology field to 
categorize the theoretical and empirical investigations of this construct: (1) trait-based, 
(2) sociocognitive, and (3) personological approaches.  
The trait-based approach – or the “having” side of personality (Walker, 2014) – 
proposes that moral identity functions similar to personality traits. By having morally 
relevant traits or attributing moral values as important to one’s sense of self, these traits 
and self-important values should appear consistent across situation and contexts overtime 
(Walker, 2014). The research from this approach has identified various moral traits that 
are characteristic of a moral identity in adolescence and adulthood, such as: being honest, 
caring, having integrity, and knowing what is wrong/right (e.g., Hardy, Walker, Olsen, 
Skalski, & Basinger, 2011; Reimer, DeWitt Goudelock, & Walker, 2009; Walker, 1999; 
Walker & Pitts, 1998). After identifying these moral traits, research has found that the 
self-importance of these moral traits is predictive of moral behaviour (e.g., Hardy, 
Walker, Gray, Ruchty, & Olsen, 2012).   
In contrast, the sociocognitive approach to moral identity – the “doing” side of 
personality (Walker, 2014) – emerged in the early 2000s and view moral identity as 
malleable by situational factors that activate implicit and deliberative cognitive-affective 
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processes or sociocognitive schemas that guide self-regulation and behaviour (Lapsley & 
Narvaez, 2004). From this perspective, moral identity is the degree to which these “moral 
schemas” are readily accessible such that those who have higher levels of moral identity 
are more ready to efficiently respond to moral situations (Hardy, Krettenauer, & Hunt, in 
press). Thus, moral identity is presumed to be implicit and automatic. For example, 
Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, and Felps (2009) demonstrated the combined influence of 
situational and dispositional factors on moral behaviour in a sample of undergraduate 
students. They found that cooperative behaviour over time was only evidenced in the 
moral priming condition (when moral identity was made salient) for those who already 
reported high levels of moral identity (based on the centrality or strength of moral 
identity). Therefore, this research supports the notion that situational context has a 
considerable impact on moral identity functioning.   
Both the trait-based and sociocognitive accounts of moral identity do not place 
development at the forefront and heavily rely on a single layer of personality description 
(i.e., behavioural traits) (Walker, 2014) and commitment to a particular personality 
theory (Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). The trait-based approach centres on temporal 
stability and cross-context consistency, whereas the sociocognitive approach focuses on 
malleability and situational-dependency. Moreover, these two accounts emphasize 
different understandings of what moral identity entails: character (trait-based) versus 
context (sociocognitive) (Walker, 2014). Evidently, a more integrative account is needed 
beyond trait-based and sociocognitive approaches to moral identity to include other 
aspects of personality (e.g., motivation, integrative life narratives) that are relevant to 
moral functioning as well as to better explain the systematic development of moral 
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identity over the lifespan. Recently, a more integrative framework – the personological 
approach – has been established that addresses the aforementioned limitations of trait-
based and sociocognitive accounts of moral identity to go beyond behaviour traits and 
include the consideration of contexts, motivations, and life narratives (Walker, 2014). 
This approach references various aspects of personality that address important areas of 
moral identity development that perhaps were neglected in previous research 
(Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015; Walker, 2014). 
The Personological Approach to Moral Identity Development: A Three-Layer 
Model 
The personological approach to moral identity proposes that there are different 
layers of moral identity that are equally important for describing a moral person 
(Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015; Walker, 2014). This approach utilizes McAdams’ (2009) 
theory of personality, specifically his three-layer model of personality, as an integrative 
framework for the study of moral personality and development (Pratt & Hardy, 2014). 
These three layers are: (1) dispositional traits, (2) characteristic adaptations, and (3) 
integrative life narratives. At the first layer, moral identity can be reflected on the 
broadest and least contextualized layer of moral traits or moral values attributed as 
important to the self in general (e.g., being caring, honest, fair, trustworthy), which 
account for behavioural consistencies (Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). At the layer of 
characteristic adaptations, moral identity can be reflected in motivational and social 
cognitive aspects of personality. More specifically, motivations and goal orientations that 
individuals uphold in various social contexts (e.g., being a caring parent), and thus may 
be more variable across time and context (Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015; Pratt & Hardy, 
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2014). At the third layer of integrative life narratives, moral identity can be reflected in 
the degree to which moral values, moral themes, and/or self-related insights are salient in 
individuals’ narratives about their past moral achievements (moral behaviour) and moral 
failures (immoral behaviour). By studying moral identity from a personological approach 
with McAdams’ framework, Krettenauer and Hertz (2015) suggest that moral identity is 
not limited to one dimension, but that different aspects of moral identity can be shown at 
each layer of personality, some of which may be more stable and trait-like, whereas 
others may be more context-dependent and changeable over time.  
To date, there is little research on the development of these personality layers 
within the moral identity construct. Several studies have systematically investigated age-
related changes in moral identity during the adolescent and emerging adulthood years 
with limited evidence despite models of moral identity development that consider this age 
period crucial for moral identity formation (for an overview, see Krettenauer & Hertz, 
2015). A critical review of the moral identity literature by Krettenauer and Hertz (2015) 
revealed that the lack of empirical evidence for moral identity development might be due 
to the limited age range included in studies, as well as conceptual and measurement 
issues. In response to these limitations, Krettenauer and colleagues have developed a 
research program using more sophisticated methodology in a series of published articles.  
First, Krettenauer, Murua, and Jia (2016) expanded the age range in their sample 
(14 to 65 years instead of only focusing on adolescents or adults) and also investigated 
the context-differentiation of moral identity. For general self-descriptions, individuals 
differentiate their self-descriptions depending on the social context and the social role 
assumed (Diehl & Hay, 2007). As such, at the trait layer of moral identity, Krettenauer et 
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al. (2016) aimed to examine both self-importance of moral values across social contexts, 
as well as cross-context differentiation given that morality is not limited to only one 
social context. They found age-related increases in the self-importance of moral values 
and that cross-context differentiation of the self-importance of moral values increased 
from adolescence to early adulthood, peaking at age 25 years then declining afterwards. 
In other words, as individuals age, they increasingly attribute moral values as important 
to the self; and during adolescence and emerging adulthood, individuals’ self-importance 
of moral values become increasingly differentiated across contexts. Moreover, the self-
importance of these moral values was positively related to personality traits of 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability.  
Second, at the layer of characteristic adaptations of moral identity, Krettenauer 
and Victor (2017) examined age-related change in one’s moral motivation for the self-
importance of moral values (i.e., moral identity motivation), while also considering 
context-specificity. They argued that self-importance of moral values (layer one of moral 
identity) need to be differentiated from moral identity motivation (layer two of moral 
identity) given that an individuals’ reason or motive for the importance of a particular 
moral value may vary. For example, people may agree that being honest is a self-
important moral value, but one person may think it is important for self-interested reasons 
(i.e., leaving a good impression on others) while another person believes it is important 
for fairness reasons (i.e., treating others how they want to be treated). Numerous models 
of ego and identity development have proposed a general developmental trend towards 
greater levels of internal motivation with age (see Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). In line 
with theoretical expectations, Krettenauer and Victor (2017) found age-related increases 
MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT                                                                     9 
in internal moral identity motivation, as well as context-dependent differentiation of 
moral identity motivation such that individuals (age ranging from 14 to 65 years) were 
more internally motivated to behave morally in the contexts of family and community 
compared to school/work. 
Finally, at the narrative layer of moral identity, individuals are able to create a 
sense of connection and meaning over time by reflecting on autobiographical accounts of 
life experiences and events, which evidently shapes one’s identity (e.g., Erikson 
1959/1980; McAdams, 2001; McLean & Pasupathi, 2012). Compared to the other layers, 
much less is known about the development of the narrative layer of moral identity, 
though Proulx and Chandler (2009) proposed a general developmental trend of 
adolescents’ self-views that reflect increased context-dependency such that one narrates 
their good behaviours as internally motivated and their bad behaviours as externally 
provoked. On the other hand, Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013) found that self-event 
connection increases with age such that adults were more likely to make a connection 
between past immoral behaviour and their current self compared to adolescents. 
Moreover, internal moral motivation strongly predicted the strength of self-event 
connections (i.e., the degree to which a past event is connected to the current self) as well 
as the acceptance of conflicting events. Therefore, individuals with higher levels of 
internal moral motivation were able to draw stronger connections between their past 
(im)moral actions and their present self. At the same time, among children and 
adolescents, Recchia, Wainryb, Bourne, and Pasupathi (2015) found that adolescents 
were better at drawing self-related insights from their narrative accounts of past immoral 
behaviour compared to children. Therefore, individuals do not simply externalize their 
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immoral behaviours, but in fact may integrate them into their current self. Given these 
discrepant findings that suggest perhaps adolescence is the age period wherein increased 
context-dependency in moral motivations exists, more narrative approaches to 
understanding moral identity development is needed. By combining the narrative 
approach (layer three of moral identity) with the previous layers that suggest context-
differentiation and dependency (layer one and layer two of moral identity), studying 
developmental changes in moral identity across younger age periods is also possible. 
More specifically, the ways in which children versus adolescents connect morally 
relevant experiences to their sense of self, as well as describe their narratives depending 
on both moral (i.e., transgressive, prosocial) and social contexts (i.e., family, friends) 
have yet to be explored. 
Evidently, developmental changes on these layers have been demonstrated in 
separate empirical investigations, but not systemically in a single investigation and 
primarily conducted with adolescents and beyond. Despite evidence of moral 
development in childhood (e.g., Kochanska, 2002; Krettenauer, Campbell, & Hertz, 
2013), the vast majority of research on moral identity focuses on its development in 
adolescence and emerging adulthood – the “critical developmental period” – as scholars 
argue that maturity and understanding of moral norms and values increase during this 
time to better integrate morality and identity (e.g., Hardy & Carlo, 2011b). Nonetheless, 
moral identity development is a lifelong process that is not restricted to adolescence or 
emerging adulthood (Damon, 1996; Krettenauer et al., 2016; Lapsley & Stey, 2014). 
Based on the research on toddlers’ and children’s moral self-concept, some researchers 
have argued that the moral self may be a precursor to later moral identity (e.g., 
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Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 2002; Kochanska, Koenig, Barry, Kim, & Yoon, 
2010; Krettenauer, 2018; Krettenauer et al., 2013; Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015). 
Moreover, similar to moral identity, children’s moral self in middle childhood becomes 
increasingly predictive of moral emotions and social behaviours (Krettenauer et al., 2013; 
Sengsavang & Krettenauer 2015), but its potential development during this time is 
understudied. In fact, Nucci (2004) identified the lack of developmental continuity from 
childhood to adolescence as a major weakness of research on the moral identity construct. 
Overview of The Present Dissertation Research 
This dissertation research aimed to address the limitations of previous research to 
better understand how the multifaceted concept of moral identity develops. Specifically, 
the neglected developmental period of elementary school years up to adolescence was 
examined utilizing the integrative personological approach to moral identity by drawing 
on research that has been used with adolescence and emerging adults (Krettenauer & 
Mosleh, 2013; Krettenauer et al., 2016; Krettenauer & Victor, 2017). In addition, 
methodologies used with children and adolescents were drawn to adhere to the 
dissertation’s younger sample of participants in middle childhood and adolescence. 
Moreover, given Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological systems theory, human 
development and thus identity development is a result of the dynamic and interactive 
process between individuals and their various ecosystems from the most intimate or 
personal ecological system that a person is in direct contact with (microsystem) to the 
larger societal or cultural ecological system (macrosystem) that may indirectly affect 
one’s development. These interactive processes in one’s environment includes but not 
limited to: family, friends, school/work, neighbours in the community, cultural 
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background, as well as the country in which one was raised. This indicates that identity 
research, including this dissertation, must consider contexts most relevant to the 
developmental age period under study. It is now clear that researchers need to expand the 
scope of inquiry to be more inclusive and examine: (1) the three layers of moral identity, 
while also focusing on (2) younger developmental periods, (3) individual differences in 
moral development, as well as (4) social contexts, which have all been limited in the past. 
A new empirical approach for assessing moral identity during this developmental 
transition period was used that combines moral values, narratives, social contexts (i.e., 
family, friends, school) and moral contexts (i.e., prosocial, antisocial) along with teacher-
reports of student’s social behaviours as a measure of their moral behaviour. This 
research from a personological approach tested a new methodology that is more inclusive 
of all three layers of moral identity and expands the scope of past research for empirically 
investigating individual and age-related differences in the development of moral identity.  
Given the complexity and richness of each layer of moral identity, this 
dissertation is separated into three chapters that can be considered as three research topics 
all framed within one study. The chapters each tap into the different layers of moral 
identity development as outlined by McAdams’ (2009) model of personality, while 
incorporating teacher-reports of moral behaviour as well as self-reports of parent-child 
relationship quality. It is important to note that these three chapters are part of the larger 
dissertation project that utilized a multi-informant, mixed-method design with the same 
sample of children and adolescents. Thus, only methods pertaining to each layer of moral 
identity and accordingly each chapter was specifically described to reduce redundancy.  
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The first chapter centres on the self-importance and context-specificity of moral 
values (trait layer of moral identity). Conceptually, traits do not vary across contexts and 
thus are usually generalized across all aspects of life, but empirically we1 investigated 
this claim by including context-specificity similar to Krettenauer et al. (2016). The social 
contexts most relevant to this age group, specifically family, friends and school, were 
examined to better understand if the self-importance of moral values changed depending 
on the social context. Given that positive parent-child relationship quality has been linked 
to self-identity development in the moral domain (e.g., Kochanska, Aksan, & Joy, 2007; 
Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015), the role of parent-child relationship quality at the trait 
layer of moral identity was also studied.  
The focus of the second chapter was moral identity motivation (characteristic 
adaptations layer of moral identity), particularly the reasons or motives behind the self-
importance of moral values, and how it develops across middle childhood and 
adolescence. Moreover, given that the characteristic adaptations or motivational layer of 
personality is rooted in situation-specific or context-specific understanding that guide 
behaviour, we also examined how moral identity motivation related to teacher-reports of 
moral behaviour and self-reports of parent-child relationship quality.  
Finally, the last chapter includes an explanation of how moral narratives provide 
increased richness to understanding moral identity development (narrative layer of moral 
identity), by specifically examining how children and adolescents describe and interpret 
                                               
1 Throughout this dissertation, the personal pronoun "we" rather than "I" is used in order to acknowledge 
that this project was a collaborative effort including myself, my thesis advisor (Dr. Krettenauer) and 
students in our research lab who assisted with data collection and coding (notably Kathleen Bauer (née 
Tamming) and Luc Saulnier). Nonetheless, the author of this thesis accepts full responsibility for all claims 
made in this thesis document. 
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past morally relevant behaviour. This was the first study to examine how both types of 
moral experiences (transgressive, prosocial), as well as how the social context (family, 
friends) in which the moral failures and moral achievements occurred may change the 
way individuals construe these experiences.  
Taken together, this dissertation research (1) utilized recent innovative moral 
identity research methodologies that has been completed mainly with adolescents and 
adults and expanded it to a younger developmental period, and (2) comprehensively 
examined moral identity development as a multifaceted, context-dependent self-structure, 
while investigating its association to parenting, on the one hand, and moral behaviour, on 
the other. Based on the current literature discussed above, the general research question 
of this dissertation project is: how does moral identity form in the course of individual 
development during the understudied transition period from middle childhood to 
adolescence?  
CHAPTER I: The Self-Importance of Moral Values and Context-Specificity Across 
Middle Childhood and Adolescence 
Traditionally, research on personality and identity has focused on trait-based 
approaches, especially after the five-factor model of personality (also known as the Big 
Five model) became widely accepted (see McAdams & Pals, 2006). Moral identity can 
also be examined from the personality layer of traits when considering the stability and 
cross-situational consistency of moral identity similarly to traits. Given that moral 
identity may function similar to personality traits, the importance of moral traits or moral 
values to one’s sense of self should be consistent across contexts and time (Walker, 
2014). Morality (i.e., promoting other people’s welfare, harm avoidance, caring for 
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others, fairness) requires action that is guided by a person’s moral intentions which 
provides the behaviour with moral meaning within the framework of the person’s moral 
understanding (Blasi, 2005). Indeed, moral identity has been shown to be highly 
influential for everyday moral functioning (e.g., Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Johnston & 
Krettenauer, 2011) and thus an important construct in the area of moral development. 
Over the last several decades, this construct has gained popular interest as a predictor of 
moral behaviour in multiple disciplines, though its development has been much less 
explored. 
Moral identity is traditionally seen as the extent to which moral values are 
integrated into an individual’s sense of self (see Hardy & Carlo, 2011b). Unsurprisingly, 
there are individual differences in the extent to which moral values are integrated into 
one’s sense of self. For instance, moral values such as being trustworthy, honest, or fair 
might be central to some people’s identity, whereas nonmoral values such as being 
outgoing, popular, and independent are considered more important for others. According 
to Krettenauer et al. (2016), “these individual differences are attributable to different 
developmental trajectories, where some individuals were able to achieve a higher level of 
morality-self integration than others” (p. 972). Historically, the majority of the research 
on moral identity development is focused on the “critical developmental period” of 
adolescence and emerging adulthood (cf. Blasi, 2005; Frimer & Walker, 2009; Hardy & 
Carlo, 2011b), however this does not imply that moral identity development is limited to 
this age period (Damon, 1996; Lapsley & Stey, 2014). Given that there has been little 
empirical evidence for age-graded change in adolescence or emerging adulthood (see 
Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015), amongst other leaders in the field, Hardy and Carlo (2011b) 
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suggest that there is limited knowledge about the developmental trajectories of moral 
identity. 
Moral identity can be found in earlier developmental periods, though this has 
often been referred as the moral self rather than moral identity per se. Currently, it is 
unknown when moral identity emerges, but scholars have provided valuable insights into 
the development of a moral self as a precursor of later moral identity (e.g., Kochanska, 
2002; Kochanska et al., 2010; Krettenauer, 2018; Krettenauer et al., 2013; Sengsavang & 
Krettenauer, 2015). Moreover, precursors to moral self development include but not 
limited to: early conscience development of moral emotions and internalization of rules, 
as well as understanding of mental states in others and oneself (theory of mind) (for an 
overview, see Thompson, 2014). According to Krettenauer (2013, 2018), the integration 
of self and morality (i.e., moral selfhood) is multifaceted and develops in childhood 
through a three-layer model of moral self that occurs at different points in time: moral 
self as an intentional agent (ages 3- to 5-years with instrumental intentions such as one’s 
self-interest), volitional agent (ages 6- to 8-years with intentions to act morally beginning 
to move from external to internal obligation), and identified agent (moral conduct reflects 
one’s self-ideal). Early occurring processes involved in moral self-identification, such as 
rule internalization (Kochanska & Thompson, 1997), become further integrated into 
one’s sense of self when these moral rules become associated with children’s ideal self, 
which leads to an emerging moral identity (Krettenauer, 2013). Evidently, the concept of 
the moral self primarily refers to motivational processes and is conceptually related to 
moral identity, but does not have all aspects of a fully developed moral identity. The 
integration of morality and identity during adolescence and adulthood is based on an 
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increased sense of agency and responsibility for one’s thoughts, emotions, and 
behaviours with greater concern for self-consistency (see Hardy & Carlo, 2011b). 
Children, on the other hand, have a lower sense of moral responsibility compared to 
adolescents and adults given children’s limited perception of agency and responsibility 
(e.g., Nunner-Winkler, 2007). At the same time, Lapsley (2015) argued that “we should 
also not conclude too hastily that childhood is a theoretical void with nothing of interest 
to contribute to a developmental story for moral identity…A plausible developmental 
account of the moral personality would not begin in adolescence…but in early 
childhood” (p. 168). Therefore, although research on children’s moral self has been 
discussed in the context of moral identity development (Hardy & Carlo, 2011b; Lapsley 
& Stey, 2014), the present study focused on moral identity development during the 
neglected age period of middle childhood to adolescence to better understand general 
age-related trends beginning prior to adolescence.  
 At the trait layer of moral identity from McAdams’ (2009) model of personality, 
moral identity is reflected in the self-importance of moral traits or moral values. Traits 
are commonly understood to be relatively stable and equally apply to various areas of 
life, but individuals do make context-specific modifications in their overall self-
descriptions based on their expected social role (i.e., child, student, friend) (Diehl & Hay, 
2007). As such, the development of personality cannot be restricted to only mean-level 
changes, as one considers the general developmental trend of self-concept differentiation 
and integration across contexts over time (see Harter, 2012). This context-specific 
differentiation of self-representation can be seen as an important developmental 
achievement with the construction of multiple selves reflecting cognitive growth and 
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increased differentiation in social role expectations, especially during early to mid-
adolescence where there is an increased differentiation in self-descriptions across various 
social contexts of family, friends, and school (Harter, 2012; Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, 
& Whitesell, 1997; Harter & Monsour, 1992). Furthermore, in a sample of participants 
aged 14 to 65 years, the mean-level of moral identity (averaged across contexts of family, 
school/work, and community) significantly increased in the adult years, while cross-
context differentiation revealed a nonlinear trend peaking at age 25 years (Krettenauer et 
al., 2016). Thus, with age, one’s self-descriptions seem to depend less on their self-view 
in the context of their friends, family, romantic partner, or co-worker. However, this self-
concept integration and differentiation in moral values has not been empirically 
addressed during the transition period of middle childhood and adolescence.  
Given that morality pertains to all areas of life (e.g., family, friends, school) but 
has somewhat different demand characteristics in each area (Krettenauer et al., 2016), the 
self-integration of moral values may be context-dependent. In fact, moral identity has 
been conceptualized as a “context-dependent self structure that becomes differentiated 
and (re)integrated in the course of development and that involves a broad range of value 
orientations” (Krettenauer et al., 2016, p. 981). Consequently, when investigating moral 
identity at the trait layer, we need to consider cross-context differentiation as an 
important aspect of moral identity development in addition to traditional mean-level 
change. Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological systems theory suggests that individual's 
sense of identity is a result of their interactions with others in their lives at home, at 
school, at work, and in their community and society at large, over time. Thus, any 
empirical investigation examining morality must take into account contexts on multiple 
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levels in order to understand moral development. For the developmental age period 
between middle childhood and adolescence, the contexts of family, friends, and school 
are of utmost importance. Although most individuals are moral (i.e., have moral values), 
it is imperative to better understand how the self-importance of moral values differs with 
age as well as differs depending on social context. 
The existing literature on moral development has been relatively consistent in 
demonstrating how the family, specifically the parents, influences children’s moral 
development (for an overview, see Sengsavang & Krettenauer, in press). In terms of self-
identity development, parenting has been predictive of moral self or moral identity 
amongst young children (Kochanska et al., 2007), in elementary-aged children 
(Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015), as well as in adolescents (e.g., Hardy, Bhattacharjee, 
Reed & Aquino, 2010; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1999; Patrick & Gibbs, 2012). For example, 
positive parent-child relationships characterized by high levels of parental support and 
low levels of negative interaction predicted higher scores in children’s moral self 
(Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015). Nonetheless, an empirical measure of moral identity 
that also accounts for various social contexts (e.g., family, school, community) has only 
been recently applied to moral development research (for an overview, see Krettenauer et 
al., 2016). The present study aimed to replicate previous studies that link parenting to 
moral identity development using Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) moral identity interview to 
assess individual’s moral identity in three different social contexts (family, friends, and 
school) during the transition period from middle childhood to adolescence. 
In summary, following research on personality development and moral identity 
development across the lifespan, the present study expected two age-related trends in 
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moral identity development during the transition period of middle childhood and 
adolescence. As the first study to explore age-related patterns in mean-level of the self-
importance of moral values (averaged across contexts of family, friends, and school) 
from middle childhood to adolescence, it was unclear what the trends would be given that 
Krettenauer et al. (2016) found increases with age from adolescence to middle age, but 
when investigating younger age groups, Krettenauer et al. (2013) found a slight decrease 
with age over the elementary school years. However, as the mean-level increased during 
the transition period from adolescence to adulthood in Krettenauer et al. (2016), we 
expected a similar pattern during the transition from middle childhood and adolescence. 
Secondly, cross-context differentiation of moral identity was also expected to 
demonstrate a linear increase during this age period given that Harter and colleagues 
(1992, 1997, 2012) found increased differentiation in adolescence. Finally, a replication 
of previous findings was expected wherein positive parent-child relationship quality (i.e., 
high levels of parental support, low levels of parent-child negative interaction) will be 
predictive of moral identity. The present study was the first to examine mean-level and 
cross-context differentiation of moral identity amongst individuals from the elementary 
school years through the adolescent years, while also exploring the role of parent-child 
relationship quality. Accordingly, we may be better able to delineate age-related trends in 
moral identity as well as add to the existing literature on parenting and moral identity 
development.  
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Method 
Participants 
 The sample consisted of 190 participants (101 females) from three different age 
groups of approximately equal size: middle childhood (Grades 4-5; n = 65; M = 10.11 
years, SD = 0.71), early adolescence (Grades 7-8; n = 68, M = 13.26 years, SD = 0.53), 
and mid-adolescence (Grades 10-11; n = 57; M = 16.00 years, SD = 0.67). Age group was 
unrelated to gender, c2 (2, N = 190) = 3.66, p = .16. Table 1 provides a summary of all 
demographic variables by age group. Upon receiving ethics approval from Wilfrid 
Laurier University’s Research Ethics Board, the Waterloo Region District School Board 
(WRDSB), and the Waterloo Catholic District School Board (WCDSB), principals from 
local elementary schools, middle schools, and high schools were contacted in order to 
distribute information letters and consent forms to eligible teachers who were interested 
in participating. All participants provided informed consent before participating. 
Participants received a $7 (Grades 4-5 and Grades 7-8) or $20 (Grades 10-11) 
honorarium for their time and were entered into a raffle to win one of three iTunes gift 
cards valued at $25. All participating schools also received a classroom donation of $5 
(Grades 4-5 and Grades 7-8) or $10 (Grades 10-11) for each participating student. All 
participants were treated in accordance to the American Psychological Association’s 
‘Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct’ (American Psychological 
Association, 2008). 
At the time of data collection, all participants were residing in South-Western 
Ontario. Most participants (65.78%) self-identified as Canadian of European descent. Of 
participants, 25.13% had an Asian (South, East, South-East) background (e.g., Pakistani, 
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Indian, Filipino, Taiwanese, Korean), 5.35% had an African background (e.g., 
Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan), and 3.74% self-identified as Arabian or Arabic. In 
the present sample, ethnic background (European Canadian: 1 = yes, 0 = no) was not 
related to age group c2 (2, N = 187) = 3.90, p = .14, or gender, c2 (1, N = 187) = 0.74, p = 
.39 (see Table 1).  
For assessing socioeconomic status (SES), the validated International Socio-
Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) was used (Ganzeboom, De Graaf, & 
Treiman, 1992). Participants were asked to provide descriptions of their adult caregivers’, 
typically mother’s and father’s, current occupations (most recent occupation, if 
unemployed). Job descriptions were coded according to the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) and transferred into the ISEI. Parents’ ISEI 
scores were averaged and could theoretically range from 10 to 90 with a midpoint of the 
scale at 50. In the present sample, participants’ ISEI score was just slightly above average 
(see Table 1). The three age groups did differ with regard to SES, F(2, 185) = 6.76, p = 
.001 and post-hoc tests (Scheffé’s; p < .05) revealed that SES for the youngest age group 
(middle childhood) were significantly lower than the two older age groups (early 
adolescence and mid-adolescence). 
Measures and Procedures  
This study included a mixed-method cross-sectional design with 45-minute semi-
structured interviews and a 15-minute self-report questionnaire. This study was part of a 
larger mixed-method cross-sectional and multi-informant study; thus, only procedures 
and measures relevant to the present study are discussed.  
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The interview was based on Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) moral identity interview 
procedure conducted to assess individual’s moral identity in three different social 
contexts (family, friends, and school). The questionnaire was used to assess social 
desirability response bias, socioeconomic status, and parent-child relationship quality. 
Interviews were audiotaped, transcribed verbatim, and de-identified to maintain 
confidentiality and privacy of all participants. In the interview, both open-ended and 
standardized response formats were used, but only standardized responses were analyzed 
in the present study.  
Children and adolescents were interviewed individually in a private room at the 
child’s school or a university’s laboratory. The interview began with the interviewer 
briefly explaining why he/she is there to talk to the child, as well as the purpose of the 
laptop computer (to record participant’s responses), digital recording device (to record 
the interview), and the picture boards (to make it easier to talk about personal attributes). 
Moreover, the interviewer ensured that the child was comfortable with saying “I don’t 
know” if he/she was unsure of their response rather than guessing. Finally, the 
interviewer reassured the participant about the importance of his/her honesty and that 
their responses were strictly confidential. After the participant provided oral assent, the 
interviewer began the interview then afterwards gave them the questionnaire. 
Moral identity interview. The Moral Identity Interview procedure for assessing 
moral identity from Krettenauer et al. (2016) was slightly modified for the middle 
childhood and adolescence age group of the present study. The original modification in 
Krettenauer et al. (2016) was based on the widely validated Good Self-Assessment 
(Arnold, 1993), which has been extensively used with adolescents and adults, to address 
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80 value-attributes derived from previous studies that investigated individual’s 
prototypical conceptions of a moral person, as well as the addition of context-specific 
assessment of moral identity (for full procedure, see Krettenauer et al., 2016). In the 
present study, this interview procedure was further modified for the younger age group 
spanning from middle childhood to adolescence, including ensuring that the language 
was developmentally appropriate and that that tasks were suitable to the younger sample. 
Specifically, 13 value-attributes from five value domains were chosen based on how 
often the various 80 value-attributes were selected as most important in the adolescent 
group (14-18 years) in Krettenauer et al. (2016).2 According to the frequency analysis, 
the top value-attributes selected by the adolescent group from Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) 
study were: honest, trustworthy, genuine, responsible, forgiving, caring, selfless, 
accepting, respectful, non-judgmental, fair, compassionate, and knows what is 
right/wrong. The percentage of these attributes chosen by the adolescent group in 
Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) study as most important was 31.30% to 59.70%.  
To assess the self-importance of moral values, participants were given a set of 
magnetic labels with the value-attributes and a diagram that displayed four nested circles 
representing the varying degrees of self-importance. Participants were asked to create a 
pictorial self-portrait similar to the method developed by Harter and Monsour (1992) for 
adolescents when assessing the context-specificities in their self-concept. There were 
three diagrams with different headings, each representing the different social contexts: 
                                               
2 Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) study did not include participants in middle childhood, but the value-attributes 
selected most by their youngest age group of adolescents resonated with the present study’s younger 
sample given that prior to beginning the Moral Identity Interview, the interviewer would ask the open-
ended question of “From your point of view, what describes a highly moral person?” and many of the 13-
value-attributes were spontaneously described across all three age groups, including the youngest age group 
of middle childhood.  
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family (“How important is it for you to be ___ in the context of your family?”), friends 
(“How important is it for you to be ___ in the context of your friends?”), and school 
(“How important is it for you to be ___ in the context of your school?”). Each diagram 
was presented consecutively, where participants were instructed to place each label in the 
circle that represents its level of importance to the self from 1 = not important to me to 5 
= extremely important to me (for an illustration, see Figure 1). The order of the diagrams 
was based on computer randomization for each participant in order to control for order 
effects of social context. Therefore, various statistical indices were calculated based on 
this procedure to reflect: (1) the self-importance of moral values (mean-level across 
social contexts) and (2) cross-context differentiation of moral identity. 
Mean-level of moral identity. To assess mean-level of participants’ moral 
identity, the self-importance ratings of the value-attributes (1 = not important to me to 5 = 
extremely important to me) were averaged across all social contexts and then combined 
into a single scale with higher scores indicating higher levels of moral identity. Internal 
consistency for this scale was α = .87 with a sample mean of 3.82 and a standard 
deviation of 0.38. 
Cross-context differentiation of moral identity. In order to assess cross-context 
differentiation of moral identity, we calculated the standard deviation for each value-
attribute across social contexts. The internal consistency of this sum score was α = .67. 
Similar to Krettenauer et al. (2016), standardized residuals were computed by regressing 
cross-context differentiation on mean-level of moral identity using standard linear 
regression techniques (for a discussion, see also Baird, Le, & Lucas, 2006). Thus, this 
score reflected cross-context differentiation that is independent of mean-level, with 
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higher scores indicated greater levels of cross-context differentiation of the self-
importance of moral values. 
Social desirability. In order to measure social desirability response bias, 
participants were asked to complete the validated Children’s Social Desirability Short 
(CSD-S) scale consisting of 14 items from the Children’s Social Desirability scale 
originally developed by Crandall, Crandall, and Katkovsky (1965) (see Appendix A). 
Baxter et al. (2004) chose 14 items from the original CSD for the CSD-S. Recently, 
Miller et al. (2014) further demonstrated the CSD-S scale’s adequate test-retest reliability 
and internal consistency for subgroups of children formed by academic achievement, 
gender, socioeconomic status, and BMI percentile. Participants were presented with 14 
questions and responded to each item using a dichotomous YES versus NO response 
format. For example, “Have you ever felt like saying unkind things to a person?” and 
“Do you always listen to your parents?”. Participants received one-point for each answer 
keyed as socially desirable. The CSD-S scale scores ranged from 0 to 14, with higher 
scores indicating a greater tendency to respond in a socially desirable way. For the 
present study, internal consistency for this scale was α = .78 with a sample mean of 3.74 
and a standard deviation of 3.01. 
Parent-child relationship quality. Participants completed the widely used 
Network of Relationships Inventory-Social Provisions Version (NRI-SPV; Furman & 
Buhrmester, 1985) to assess a broad range of relationship qualities. The 13-item ‘short 
form’ of the NRI was used in the present study to reduce the ‘questionnaire load’ for 
children (see Appendix B). The short-form includes two factors, seven items representing 
‘support’ (e.g., “How much does this person help you figure out or fix things?” and “How 
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much does this person treat you like you’re admired and respected”) and six items 
representing ‘negative interaction’ (e.g., “How much do you and this person disagree or 
quarrel with each other?” and “How much do you and this person hassle or nag one 
another?”). The reliability and validity of this measure has been empirically supported in 
previous research (Furman & Buhrmester, 1985) and the two factors have shown strong 
reliability (e.g., Oberlander & Black, 2011) with Cronbach’s alpha of both factors being α 
= .89. 
Participants answered questions for relationships with their adult caregivers, 
typically a mother figure (e.g., biological/adopted mother, step-mother/father’s 
significant other, or other including another father) and a father figure (e.g., 
biological/adopted father, step-father/mother’s significant other, or other including 
another mother). It is important to note the complex family make-up in today’s modern 
society and this was communicated to participants prior to them completing the measure. 
Participants used the same set of items to answer questions about both adult caregivers. 
They were asked to rate the extent each individual satisfies each item based on a four-
point scale ranging from (1) little or none to (4) extremely much. An average score was 
computed for both subscales (e.g., maternal and paternal support, maternal and paternal 
negative interaction).  
In the present sample, internal consistency scores were high with the following 
Cronbach’s alphas: maternal support α = .80, maternal negative interaction α = .90, 
paternal support α = .83, and paternal negative interaction α = 90. Correlational analyses 
indicated a significant positive association between maternal and paternal support (r(166) 
= .34, p < .001) as well as between maternal and paternal negative interaction (r(166) = 
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.34, p < .001). Accordingly, these pairs of variables were aggregated to create summary 
variables representing parental support (i.e., participants’ perceived support from both 
caregivers) and parent-child negative interaction (i.e., participant’s perceived negative 
interaction with both caregivers). Internal consistencies were high for both parental 
support and parent-child negative interaction, α = .83 and α = .86 respectively. Like 
Sengsavang and Krettenauer (2015), the sample mean was higher for parental support (M 
= 2.98, SD = .51) than for parent-child negative interaction (M = 1.83, SD = .53). 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses were conducted to identify if gender, social desirability, 
ethnicity and/or SES would be included as control variables in the main analyses.3 A 
multiple regression with mean-level of moral identity as the dependent variable and 
gender, social desirability response bias, ethnicity and SES as predictors, yielded a 
significant overall effect, F(4, 163) = 5.36, p < .001. Social desirability response bias was 
a significant predictor of individual’s mean-level of moral identity, β = .33, p < .001. 
However, gender, ethnicity, and SES were not significantly related to mean-level of 
moral identity, βgender = -.03, p = .66, βethnicity = .05, p = .53, and βSES = .04, p = .62, 
respectively. Another multiple regression with cross-context differentiation of moral 
identity on gender, social desirability, ethnicity and SES yielded a significant overall 
effect, F(4, 163) = 3.94, p = .004. Social desirability response bias and ethnicity were 
significant predictors of individual’s cross-context differentiation, β = -.25, p = .002 and 
β = -.17 p = .024, respectively. However, gender and SES were not significantly related 
                                               
3 All analyses for this dissertation project were based on two-tailed hypothesis testing using an alpha level 
of .05 for all statistical tests.  
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to cross-context differentiation, β = -.04, p = .61 and β = -.05, p = .50, respectively. As a 
result of these preliminary analyses, only social desirability response bias was used as a 
control variable in the main analyses with mean-level of moral identity. For main 
analyses with cross-context differentiation, both social desirability response bias and 
ethnicity were used as control variables. Assumptions of normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity were met.  
Mean-Level of Moral Identity and Age  
 The bivariate correlation between mean-level of moral identity (averaged across 
contexts) and age revealed a significant negative relationship, r(187) = -.22, p = .002. 
Next, a multiple regression was performed to examine the effect of age group on mean-
level of moral identity. Age group was entered as two dummy variables (age1 = early 
adolescents in Grades 7-8, age2 = mid-adolescents in Grades 10-11) with the reference 
group as the youngest age group (middle childhood in Grades 4-5) in Step 1 followed by 
social desirability entered in Step 2 (see Table 2). Overall, model 1 was significant, F(2, 
169) = 6.29, p = .002, with age2 as the only significant effect and age1 was marginally 
significant, suggesting that participants in early adolescence (M = 3.82, SD = .41) and 
mid-adolescence (M = 3.70, SD = .34) have lower scores in mean-level of moral identity 
than participants in middle childhood (M = 3.93, SD = .36). There was a significant DR2   
= .078, p < .001 when social desirability was added to the model, F(3, 168) = 9.67, p < 
.001, with social desirability and age2 as significant effects. The effect of age2 dropped 
from -.30 to -.21, but still remained significant above and beyond the effect of social 
desirability. Age1 was no longer significant once social desirability was entered into the 
model. Mean-level of moral identity appeared to decrease with age, such that participants 
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in middle childhood had significantly higher mean-levels of moral identity than mid-
adolescents, even after controlling for social desirability.   
Cross-Context Differentiation of Moral Identity and Age 
The bivariate correlation between cross-context differentiation of moral identity 
(standardized residual score, controlling for mean-level) and age revealed a significant 
positive relationship, r(187) = .21, p = .004. Similar to the mean-level analysis, a multiple 
regression was performed to examine the effect of age group on cross-context 
differentiation of moral identity. The two age group dummy variables were entered in 
Step 1 followed by social desirability and ethnicity in Step 2 (see Table 2). Overall, 
model 1 was significant, F(2, 167) = 4.18, p = .017, with age2 as the only significant 
effect and age1 was marginally significant, suggesting that participants in middle 
childhood (M = -.05, SD = .15) had less cross-context differentiation than participants in 
early adolescence (M = .01, SD = .14) and mid-adolescence (M = .04, SD = .17). When 
social desirability and ethnicity were added to the model, there was a significant DR2   = 
.057, p = .006, F(4, 165) = 4.85, p = .001, with social desirability, ethnicity, and age2 as 
significant effects. The effect of age2 dropped from .25 to .18, but still remained 
significant above and beyond the effect of social desirability and ethnicity. Age1 was no 
longer significant once social desirability and ethnicity were entered into the model. The 
findings indicated that cross-context differentiation in moral identity appears to increase 
with age especially between middle childhood and mid-adolescence, even after 
controlling for social desirability and ethnicity.  
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Effects of Parent-Child Relationship Quality on Mean-Level of Moral Identity 
The bivariate correlations between parent-child relationship quality and mean-
level of moral identity revealed a significant positive relationship between parental 
support and moral identity, r(169) = .21, p = .005, as well as a significant negative 
relationship between parent-child negative interaction and moral identity, r(169) = -.20, p 
= .01. A multiple regression was performed to examine the effect of parent-child 
relationship quality on mean-level of moral identity. Both parental support and parent-
child negative interaction were entered in Step 1 followed by social desirability and age 
in years entered in Step 2. Overall, model 1 was significant, F(2, 168) = 5.48, p = .005, 
with parental support (β = .16, p = .04) significantly and parent-child negative interaction 
(β = -.13, p = .09) marginally predicting moral identity. Once social desirability and age 
in years were added to the model as control variables, there was a significant DR2   = .105, 
p < .001, F(4, 166) = 8.28, p < .001, with parental support (β = .17, p = .03) and social 
desirability (β = .28, p < .001) as significant effects. Evidently, parental support 
positively and significantly predicted mean-level of moral identity above and beyond 
social desirability, age, and parent-child negative interaction. 
Discussion 
The present study was the first of its kind to examine mean-level and cross-
context differentiation of moral identity with a younger sample during the transition from 
middle childhood (Grades 4-5) to adolescence (Grades 7-8 and Grades 10-11), which is 
significant given that development does not begin at adolescence but is a lifelong process. 
Thus, the present study was able to shed some insight onto how moral identity develops 
prior to adolescence. More specifically, this study extended previous work by (1) 
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investigating earlier developmental periods given that moral identity development is not 
limited to the “critical developmental period” of adolescence and emerging adulthood, (2) 
examining moral identity defined as the context-dependent self-integration of moral 
values, and (3) exploring the role of parenting in this context-dependent examination of 
moral identity. In summary, results indicated that mean-level of moral identity (averaged 
across the three contexts) decreased with age, such that children had significantly higher 
levels of moral identity than adolescents, even after controlling for social desirability. 
Cross-context differentiation of moral identity, on the other hand, significantly increased 
with age, especially between middle childhood and mid-adolescence. Finally, in line with 
previous research, parental support positively predicted mean-level of moral identity, 
above and beyond social desirability, age, and parent-child negative interaction. In the 
following, these findings and their implications are discussed in detail.  
In contrast to our hypothesis, mean-level of moral identity decreased from middle 
childhood to adolescence. Although Krettenauer et al. (2016) found a linear increase in 
mean-level of moral identity with age and sampled four different age groups, their 
youngest group consisted of adolescents aged 14-18 years, whereas the present study’s 
three age groups consisted of children as young as 8 years up to adolescents 17 years of 
age. Thus, it is difficult to compare our findings with younger age groups to Krettenauer 
et al.’s (2016) older sample. In an earlier investigation with a younger sample (aged 5- to 
12-years-old), Krettenauer et al. (2013) also found a decrease in children’s moral self-
concept with age. Therefore, the decline in mean-level of moral identity in the present 
study may be attributable to the developmental period of the sample itself, specifically 
the positivity bias that is likely inherent in our younger sample. To date, there is limited 
MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT                                                                     33 
empirical research in moral identity development from childhood to adolescence, but we 
can draw on research on the development of self-representations and self-concepts to 
elucidate the present study’s findings on moral identity. 
It has been well documented that children’s self-view is overly positive compared 
to adolescents and adults (see Harter, 1999, 2012) and self-serving biases are present in 
children and adults, but especially strong in children ages 8- to 11-years-old (for a 
review, see Trzesniewski, Kinal, & Donnellan, 2011). Overall, Trzesniewski et al. (2011) 
suggests that the developmental trends in positivity bias are likely due to cognitive 
maturation, life experiences, as well as changes in social contexts. In fact, a recent 
longitudinal study found decreases in mean-level global and domain-specific self-
concepts from late childhood to early adolescence and concluded that both biological 
(puberty) and contextual factors (school transition) play an important role in differences 
in individuals’ self-views during this sensitive transition period from late childhood to 
early adolescence (Schaffhuser, Allemand, & Schwarz, 2017). Although Schaffhuser et 
al. (2017) did not specifically examine the moral domain, given Schaffhuser et al.’s 
(2017) decrease in the mean-levels from late childhood to early adolescence, as well as 
Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) increase in mean-levels from adolescence to old age, it is 
apparent that the developmental trajectory of one’s self-identity may not be as linear as 
previous research may suggest.  
It is plausible that an individual’s self-view, including how they see and describe 
themselves as a moral person, may temporarily change as they transition into adolescence 
and become exposed to different experiences (e.g., puberty, school transitions, new 
friends) and thus other factors (e.g., social) or characteristics (e.g., non-moral values such 
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as being popular or cool) may take priority over moral values. Evidently, biological, 
psychological, and social factors need to be explored as to how they influence the moral 
domain given the important implications. In particular, if the decline in mean-level of 
moral identity is attributable to biological or psychological factors, educators and parents 
need to know that this is a vital developmental period to promote moral identity 
development. For instance, as individuals experience puberty and transition into high 
school, they might be more concerned with the need to belong and “fit in” with their 
peers rather than upholding their moral values. It is also important to note that our 
findings are statistically significant with the effect sizes being small to moderate (rage and 
mean-level = -.22 and rage and cross-context differentiation = .21), indicating that age indeed has an 
impact on moral identity, but that other factors need to be considered simultaneously. 
Therefore, in terms of practical significance of our findings, it appears that other factors 
may contribute to the decrease in mean-level of moral identity and increase in cross-
context differentiation during this age period – more specifically, perhaps puberty and the 
transition to high school. During this sensitive developmental period, adolescents may 
especially need greater support and education regarding moral values both at home and at 
school with educators and teachers considering the role of peer pressure and puberty 
during these important discussions. Given the various designs and samples with differing 
age ranges in the existing literature, future research needs to consider biological and 
social factors, as well as incorporate a wider age range of participants that begin in 
middle childhood and expands into adulthood to better understand the probable non-
linear trends in mean-levels of moral identity development.   
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We reasoned earlier, any investigation of moral identity at the trait layer needs to 
consider cross-context differentiation as well as mean-level given that the self-integration 
of moral values may be context-dependent. In line with Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) 
ecological systems theory, as well as the differentiation and integration principles of self-
development across contexts and time (Harter, 2012), when assessing moral identity 
separately for the social contexts of family, friends, and school, it was found that cross-
context differentiation of moral identity increased between middle childhood and 
adolescence. As such, throughout this developmental period, individual’s sense of moral 
identity seemed to be reflective of the interactions and relationships in their lives at 
home, with friends, and at school. This finding provides further validation (in addition to 
Krettenauer et al., 2016) of the moral identity measure for this younger sample and 
reinforces Harter’s (2012) argument of context-specific differentiation of self-
representations, especially during early to mid-adolescence.  
During this developmental period, individuals are reaching the important 
developmental milestone of cognitive growth and greater differentiation as a function of 
social contexts and socialization pressures (Daniel et al., 2012; Harter, 2012; Harter et al., 
1997; Harter & Monsour, 1992; Krettenauer et al., 2016). As individuals are experiencing 
these developmental changes from middle childhood to adolescence, their values and thus 
the way they may perceive or describe themselves become increasingly differentiated 
across contexts. From a developmental perspective, this makes sense given that in 
adolescence, individuals are experiencing new things, new environments and new peer 
groups and thus their sense of self and who they are is more differentiated and less 
integrated during this time period. Once in adulthood, individuals are more likely to 
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integrate value priorities and cohesively perceive themselves as more similar across 
contexts or different areas of life, as suggested by Krettenauer et al. (2016). This finding 
has important implications for educators and parents as they discuss morality and moral 
values with their children and students given that it is context-dependent. Educators and 
parents need to be aware that discussions about morality cannot be overly generalized 
and should be discussed with respect to specific contexts. This finding also largely 
corresponds with the empirical findings reported by Daniel et al. (2012) and Krettenauer 
et al. (2016). In the first empirical study of adolescents’ value differentiation, Daniel et al. 
(2012) found that mid-adolescents demonstrated greater value differentiation than early 
adolescents. When examining only moral values, Krettenauer et al. (2016) found a 
nonlinear effect of age on cross-context differentiation of moral identity such that there 
was an increase from adolescence to emerging adulthood and then declined in the older 
adult years. It remains an open question as to whether this nonlinear effect is simply 
reflective of generational or cohort differences within Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) large 
age-range. Nonetheless, cross-context differentiation of values appears from middle 
childhood to adolescence, but longitudinal studies should be carried out in order to better 
understand when and how moral values are differentiated and integrated throughout the 
lifespan from childhood to adulthood.   
An important finding of the present study is that despite the differences in age as 
well as in assessments of moral identity across studies (e.g., Hardy et al., 2010; 
Kochanska et al., 2007; Patrick & Gibbs, 2012; Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015), 
parental support was found to be a positive predictor of moral identity from middle 
childhood to adolescence. Participants who reported higher levels of parental support had 
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higher scores in mean-level of moral identity compared to participants with lower levels 
of parental support. This significant effect had a small to moderate effect size (r = .21), 
which suggests that although parental support had an important impact on mean-level of 
moral identity, other relationship quality indicators should be considered including 
friendship quality during this developmental period. Nonetheless, even with the inclusion 
of relevant social contexts of family, friends, and school in present study, positive 
parenting continues to play an important role in the formation of moral identity regardless 
of the social context. Parents nurture their children from a young age in their homes and 
hope that the values and lessons taught to their children transfer into other contexts as 
well. For example, parents might model that being helpful and caring is important in the 
home, which children may internalize and carry forward with their friends and peers at 
school. 
Several limitations of the present study should be addressed in future research. A 
major limitation of the study was its cross-sectional design and limited age range. 
Longitudinal models following children into adulthood would be better to disentangle the 
complex (e.g., nonlinear effects) findings of moral identity development over time and 
better explain individual and age-related changes with multiple time assessments. 
Moreover, given the biological, social, and psychological changes inherent within this 
understudied developmental period from middle childhood to adolescence (e.g., 
Schaffhuser et al., 2017), it is vital that future research designs consider how these 
changes contribute to moral identity development. Given that participants were 
predominately from the public school board, we were unable to adequately stratify the 
sample to compare differences between the public versus catholic school system; as such 
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future research should consider sampling adequately from both types of school boards to 
determine the effect of the school curriculum on moral identity development. Given the 
differences in the two school boards (e.g., Kelly, 2010), it is possible that the difference 
in school environments may influence students’ development and behaviour. As well, the 
parenting variables were based on children’s self-reports (rather than parent-reports) and 
thus we need to be cautious of any causal conclusions. It is possible that there are 
discrepancies between how parents view their relationship with their children and how 
children view the same relationship, especially if there was any conflict between the 
parent and child when the child was completing the measure which may have affected the 
accuracy of the reporting. Finally, the sample of the present study was limited to a 
Canadian sample of children and adolescents predominately of European descent and 
although morality has universal components, there are also key cultural differences in 
morality (Jia & Krettenauer, 2017). Thus it is an open question as to whether the findings 
can be generalized to other cultures for this developmental period of middle childhood to 
adolescence. Overall, the present study adds to the existing literature and demonstrated 
that moral identity development is a lifelong process that begins prior to adolescence and 
that social contexts play an important role in its development. 
CHAPTER II: The Development of Moral Identity Motivation and its Links to 
Moral Behaviour and Parent-Child Relationship Quality 
The complex system of moral identity with self-defining moral values that 
regulate behaviour cannot be fully explained by the self-importance of these values (layer 
one of McAdams’ (2009) theory of personality: traits). From a social-cognitive and 
characteristic adaptations approach (layer two of personality), moral identity entails the 
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motivational and social-cognitive features of personality, which are more context-
specific. Therefore, beyond the trait layer of personality, moral identity is also 
represented by different moral motivations and goal orientations expressed in various 
areas of life. Moral motivation can be understood as an expression of moral identity that 
is defined by each person (Doering, 2013). In moral psychology, moral motivation has 
been broadly defined as “an agent’s willingness to do what s/he judges to be right, even if 
that entails personal costs” (Nunner-Winkler, 2007, p. 402). As such, moral motivation’s 
cognitive component requires the person to understand the validity of moral rules, while 
also accepting it as personally binding (Blasi, 2004).  
Moral motivation is multifaceted (see Krettenauer & Victor, 2017) as it entails 
both motives for actions and motivation for prioritizing moral concerns over personal or 
conventional concerns. Importantly, moral identity motivation is “an individual’s 
motivation to uphold moral intentions in the face of other, potentially conflicting, 
concerns…[and] is not limited to overt moral action but includes many aspects of 
decision-making and judgment formation” (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017, p. 1). Moral 
identity motivation or the reason why a moral value is important to an individual may 
substantially vary from person to person, as well as from one social context to another. 
For instance, being honest may be an important moral value to most individuals, but the 
strength of people’s moral motivation to adhere to this moral value in real life may differ. 
For one person, it is important for them to be honest at school/work because they want to 
avoid punishment (external), whereas at home with family being honest makes them feel 
good (internal). Therefore, when an individual recognizes and acknowledges that a 
specific moral value is personally valid and important to their sense of self and do not 
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want to betray the self, morality is internally motivated (cf. Blasi, 2005). Consequently, 
one feels satisfied for doing what they consider is right. 
Developmental psychology has historically studied different forms of internal or 
autonomous motivation. According to various models of identity development, there is an 
overall developmental trend toward higher levels of self-integration or internal 
motivation given that one’s commitment to life goals and ideals become increasingly 
self-selected and less externally imposed by others (e.g., Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Marcia, 
Waterman, Matteson, Archer, & Orlofsky, 1993). According to Self-Determination 
Theory (for an overview, see Ryan & Deci, 2012), rules, values, and cultural practices 
can be integrated into the self to varying degrees and can be viewed as a continuum based 
on the degree to which the motivation appears to be controlled or autonomous with 
extrinsic motivation on one end and intrinsic motivation on the other. External or 
extrinsic motivation are based on external standards set by others, whereas internal or 
intrinsic motivation derive freely from the individual and are inherently worthwhile. The 
continuum of extrinsic motivation has different levels of self-regulation from the least 
autonomous to the most autonomous as individuals integrate social or cultural 
expectations to varying degrees: external, introjected (“should do”), identified (“want to 
do”), and integrated (regulations are fully assimilated with self). When values have 
personal meaning and integrated within one’s sense of self, the resulting behaviour will 
be self-regulated or self-chosen and thus internally initiated and autonomously driven. 
The development of internal motivation is contingent on environmental factors that 
support internal self-regulation (Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997). More specifically, 
children require environments with autonomy support, structure, and involvement in 
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order for their needs of competence and autonomy to be met and thus better promote 
internalization and integration. Internal motivation is flexible and context-dependent 
wherein it may decline over time with more extrinsic contingencies in a given social 
context (e.g., school), but may also increase in other contexts (e.g., family) (e.g., Renaud-
Dubé, Taylor, Lekes, Koestner, & Guay, 2010). Thus, it is vital that research considers 
various contexts when measuring motivation. 
Developmental trends in moral motivation have been traditionally studied in 
adolescence with internal moral motivation increasing with age (e.g., Arnold, 1993) and 
external moral motivation declining throughout adolescence (e.g., Krettenauer, 2011). 
This trend is consistent with research on adolescents’ prosocial moral reasoning (e.g., 
Eisenberg, Zhou, & Koller, 2001; Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007), as well as 
research on adolescents’ moral disengagement (Paciello, Fida, Tramontano, Lupinetti, & 
Carprara, 2008). Although Krettenauer (2011) found decreases in external moral 
motivation, internal moral motivation was unrelated to age in his adolescent sample. On 
the other hand, more recently, Krettenauer and Victor (2017) found important context-
differentiation in moral identity motivation in their cross-sectional study such that what 
motivates individuals to behave morally may be dependent on the social context. 
Specifically, they found that internal moral identity motivation was highest in the 
contexts of family and community (compared to the context of school/work) whereas 
external moral identity motivation was highest in the context of school/work (compared 
to the contexts of family and community). Moreover, their study revealed age-related 
increases in internal moral identity motivation between adolescence and young adulthood 
(plateauing at middle age), while external moral identity motivation decreased with age. 
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The discrepant findings from Krettenauer (2011) and Krettenauer and Victor (2017) 
might be due to measurement differences in assessing moral motivation (ratings of 
reasons why it is important to act morally on a 5-point scale versus openly asking 
participants for reasons why self-selected moral values are extremely important to them). 
Thus, increases in internal moral motivation may occur earlier in development than 
adolescence – a period that has been arguably the crucial age period for the development 
of moral identity.  
Traditionally, morality in childhood, such as prioritizing a moral desire over an 
immoral desire, is often viewed as more driven by external factors rather than emanating 
from the self (Hardy & Carlo, 2011a). In particular, Kohlberg’s stage model of moral 
development suggests that there is a decline in external moral motivation as adolescents 
progress beyond the preconventional stages (Stages 1 and 2) and move onto the 
conventional stages (Stages 3 and 4) where one’s own conscience becomes more salient 
(see Gibbs et al., 2007).4 At the same time, according to three contemporary, prominent 
lines of research (i.e., social domain theory, infants’ helping behaviour, and development 
of children’s empathy) (for an overview, see Sengsavang, Willemsen, & Krettenauer, 
2015), children spontaneously engage in prosocial moral actions because they genuinely 
care about the wellbeing of others and they believe it is the right thing to do regardless of 
instrumental rewards. These contemporary lines of research are in contrast to what Piaget 
(1932/1999) and Kohlberg (1976) would have stressed.  
                                               
4 Kohlberg’s (1976) preconventional stages are based on obedience and punishment, as well as 
instrumentalism or “what’s in it for me?”, whereas his conventional stages focus on good interpersonal 
relationships or “good boy/nice girl” and maintaining social conventions.  
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Moral motivation in childhood has been mostly inferred from rule justifications or 
decision-making in hypothetical dilemma situations, but when examining explicit moral 
motives of everyday moral actions, Sengsavang et al. (2015) found that overall internal 
moral motivation (i.e., fairness-related, personal-moral preferences) increased, which 
indicates higher levels of organismic integration as described by Self-Determination 
Theory (for an overview, see Deci & Ryan, 2012). On the other hand, external motives 
(i.e., self-interested, standards and rules) decreased among children aged 4- to 12-years, 
but continued to be salient among 10- to 12-year-olds in the antisocial context (i.e., 
harming others). The findings from Sengsavang et al. (2015) and Krettenauer and Victor 
(2017) seem to support Self-Determination Theory that proposes developmental 
processes move towards internal modes of self-regulation (e.g., Grolnick et al., 1997), but 
are also flexible and context-dependent (see Ryan & Deci, 2008). Evidently, it is 
important that future research expands the age range to include both children and 
adolescents to better understand how context plays a role in the development of moral 
motivation. 
Research in moral development has consistently demonstrated the important role 
the family has on children’s moral development (for an overview, see Sengsavang & 
Krettenauer, in press). The family environment, specifically parental behaviours or 
parent-child relationships, can profoundly influence the importance of morality to the self 
(Hardy et al., 2010). According to Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological systems theory, 
one’s sense of identity is a result of their interactions with people in their lives, especially 
their family and friends. Importantly, Bronfenbrenner stressed that interactions within the 
most personal ecosystem, the microsystem, are typically bidirectional such that personal 
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relationships one has with family members, friends, peers, and teachers influence one’s 
development but at the same time, how one reacts to or interacts with these individuals 
also influences how individuals treat the person in return. Arguably, the family 
environment influences their child’s morality through the broader quality of the parent-
child relationship consisting of behavioural compliance within the network of good, 
positive relations that they share (Sengsavang & Krettenauer, in press; Thompson et al., 
2006). Therefore, warm, nurturing and supportive interactions between the parent and 
child likely fosters a healthier development. For example, supportive and warm parenting 
– which is theoretically related to secure attachment – has been positively linked to the 
development of moral reasoning (e.g., Malti, Eisenberg, Kim, & Buchmann, 2013; Pratt, 
Skoe, & Arnold, 2004), moral motivation (Malti & Buchmann, 2010; Sengsavang et al., 
2015), and prosocial behaviours (e.g., Carlo, Mestre, Samper, Tur, & Armenta, 2011). 
More specifically, children reporting warm and supportive parent-child relationships as 
well as fewer negative interactions with their parents were more likely to elucidate their 
motives for moral action and were more other-oriented in their motivations compared to 
children with more negative parent-child relationships (Sengsavang et al., 2015).  
The present study was designed to address the gaps in the moral motivation 
literature as a way to better understand the development of moral identity at the second 
layer of McAdams’ (2009) personality theory. In particular, we wanted to elucidate these 
findings pertaining to moral identity motivation by exploring age-related differences in 
moral identity motivation while considering context-specificity most relevant to this age 
period (i.e., family, friends, and school), as well as how moral identity motivation relates 
to parent-child relationship quality and teacher-reported moral behaviour. Moral 
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motivation and moral behaviour are intimately connected from a theoretical perspective, 
but only a few studies have empirically examined this relation (Malti, Gummerum, & 
Buchmann, 2007; Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009). Following the 
existing research, it was reasonable to expect that moral identity motivation would be 
context-specific such that higher levels of internal moral identity motivation was 
expected in contexts of family and friends given that morality is more central to 
individuals in these contexts, while external motivation was expected to be highest in the 
context of school. As well, similar to previous research, age-related increases in internal 
moral identity motivation and decreases in external moral identity motivation were 
expected during this period from middle childhood to adolescence. Finally, higher levels 
of internal moral identity motivation were expected to be related to more positive parent-
child relationship quality and higher levels of teacher-reported moral behaviour across 
middle childhood to adolescence.  
Method 
 
Sample and Procedure 
 
The sample was the same as Chapter I with 190 participants (101 females) 
approximately evenly distributed across three different age groups. For more details on 
the sample description, recruitment and overall procedure, see Chapter I and Table 1 for 
summary of all demographic variables by age group. This study included a mixed-
method cross-sectional design with 45-minute semi-structured interviews and a 15-
minute self-report questionnaire. The interview was conducted to assess participants’ 
moral identity in three different contexts (family, friends, and school) and the 
questionnaire was used to assess parent-child relationship quality and social desirability 
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response bias. Teachers also completed a short questionnaire on their student’s social 
behaviour. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. This study was 
part of a larger mixed-method cross-sectional and multi-informant study; thus, only 
procedures and measures relevant to the present study are discussed. Two interviews 
were unscorable due to equipment failure, resulting in this Chapter’s sample to be N = 
188. These two participants were males from the early adolescent age group and 
identified themselves as Canadian of European descent. With the exclusion of these two 
participants, the sample demographics remained the same given that: age group was still 
unrelated to gender (c2 (2, N = 188) = 2.98, p = .23) and ethnic background (c2 (2, N = 
185) = 4.43, p = .11), while gender was still unrelated to ethnic background (c2 (1, N = 
185) = 0.56, p = .46), and finally age group continued to differ with regard to SES (F(2, 
183) = 6.42, p = .002). Post-hoc tests (Scheffé’s; p < .05) revealed that the youngest age 
group (middle childhood) still have significantly lower SES than the two older age 
groups (early adolescence and mid-adolescence). Therefore, there were no differences in 
the sample when excluding the two interviews that were unscorable. See Table 3 for an 
updated summary of all demographic variables by age group. 
Moral Identity Interview 
 
The Moral Identity Interview followed the same procedure developed by 
Krettenauer et al. (2016) and Krettenauer and Victor (2017) based on the widely 
validated Good Self-Assessment (Arnold, 1993) to measure moral identity and moral 
identity motivation. The procedure was slightly modified for the present study’s younger 
sample of children and adolescents (for details, see Chapter I). The interview first began 
with the ratings of the self-importance of moral values, for more details on this portion of 
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the interview, see Chapter I. After participants completed rating the self-importance of 
moral values for each diagram representing a social context, similar to previous research 
with participants in middle childhood (Sengsavang et al., 2015), participants were further 
asked to explain their reasoning. In particular, participants were asked to elaborate on the 
moral values or qualities they placed in the inner most circle of the diagram indicating 
that it was “extremely important to me”. For example, “you put being honest, caring, and 
respectful at the center of the diagram and these qualities are extremely important to you. 
How come these qualities are extremely important to you in the context of your family?’. 
Moral identity motivation. Coding categories were deductively informed from 
past research examining moral motivation (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017; Sengsavang et 
al., 2015). Coding categories were defined to capture common themes of moral identity 
motivation on a continuum from external to internal motivation as described by Self-
Determination Theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The following nine coding categories 
derived from Krettenauer and Victor (2017) (adolescents and adults) as well as 
Sengsavang et al. (2015) (middle childhood) were used as a framework for the present 
study: (1) standards and rules, (2) self-interest, (3) reputation, (4) consequences-
relationships, (5) consequences-others, (6) fairness-related, (7) relationship ideals, (8) 
role model, and (9) self ideals. These coding categories were chosen for the framework to 
best reflect individuals’ motivation to maintain their moral identity as well as were most 
suitable for the age range of the sample given that no single study has examined explicit 
moral motivation with children and adolescents. Thus, we examined coding categories 
from Sengsavang et al.’s (2015) study with participants in middle childhood and 
Krettenauer and Victor’s (2017) study with participants in adolescence and adulthood to 
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account for motivations across middle childhood and adolescence. Similar to the 
aforementioned studies, if a participant articulated more than one motive, all motives 
were coded separately. Thus, multiple responses were possible for each context. For a 
detailed description of these categories as well as interview examples, see Table 4.  
A subset of 47 transcripts (25% of total sample) was randomly selected across the 
age groups and periods of the data collection to determine agreement between two 
independent coders. For the family context, inter-coder agreement was κ = .72; for the 
context of friends, it was κ = .74; and for the context of school, it was κ = .73. 
Discrepancies between coders were discussed until consensus was reached. Establishing 
inter-coder agreement took approximately one month (August 28, 2017 to October 2, 
2017) and then one coder completed coding the remaining transcripts (n = 141) within 15 
days following establishing inter-coder reliability. For the nine coding categories 
combined across all contexts, the relative frequencies ranged from 2.96% to 20.89% (see 
Table 4).  
Following Krettenauer and Victor (2017), these coding categories were grouped 
into three category groups to represent moral identity motivation: external, internal, and 
relationship-oriented (see Table 4). Standards and rules, self-interest, and reputation 
were combined to represent external moral identity motivation given their focus on 
standards and consequences of moral actions that are external to the self. In contrast, 
consequences-others, fairness-related, relationship ideals, role model, and self ideals 
represented internal moral identity motivation as they express connection to moral values. 
Consequences-relationship can be interpreted as either internal or external motivation 
and cannot be differentiated between these two types of motivation given that it focuses 
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on a concern for consequences of moral actions on their relationships. As such, this 
coding category was kept as a separate category group labelled relationship-oriented 
moral identity motivation. The three category groups of moral identity motivation were 
used in the main analyses and scores for each category group were calculated by totalling 
the coding categories (e.g., standards and rules, self-interest, and reputation) pertaining to 
each category group (e.g., external). These calculations were computed separately for the 
three social contexts (family, friends, and school). It is important to note that given that 
multiple responses were possible in each context, as well as both internal and external 
moral identity motivation category groups encompassed multiple coding categories (e.g., 
family: self-interest (external), role model (internal), relationship ideal (internal); friends: 
reputation (external), standards and rules (external), consequences-others (internal)), the 
sum score was open-ended and had no defined maximum.  
Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics for the category groups and the scores 
indicate the number of times a particular type of moral identity motivation (external, 
internal, or relationship-oriented) was present in a given social context by participants. 
The numerical value of 0 indicates that in a given context, there was no response in any 
of the coding categories of that specific category group for that particular participant. On 
the other hand, a numerical value of 2 indicates that a participant’s responses fit into two 
coding categories from the same category group in a given context (e.g., role model and 
relationship ideal for internal moral identity motivation in the context of family). It is 
important to note that scores for one category group do not affect scores in another 
category group given that the numerical values are analytically independent. Despite 
analytical independence, the moral identity motivation category groups were empirically 
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correlated (see Table 6). Consistent with Krettenauer and Victor (2017) and Self-
Determination Theory, bivariate correlations between external and internal motivation 
were significantly negative in all three contexts, whereas consistencies across contexts 
were small to moderate, with a median bivariate correlation of r = .26. 
Questionnaire Measures 
Moral behaviour. Teachers were asked to complete a short questionnaire for 
each participant regarding their moral behaviour, specifically the two dimensions of 
prosocial and antisocial behaviours. This short questionnaire was comprised of a 
combination of two previously validated scales. First, the revised Child Behavior Scale 
(CBS; Ladd & Profilet, 1996) from Vandell et al. (2006) that included 17 items to form 
two scales, Aggressive with Peers (nine-items; e.g., “Taunts and teases other students”, 
“Argues with students”; α = .92) and Prosocial with Peers (eight-items; e.g., “Is kind 
towards students”, “Offers help or comfort when other students are upset”; α = .92). 
Secondly, 10 items from the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 
1997) was used: five items from the Prosocial scale (e.g., “Considerate of other people’s 
feelings”, “Shares readily with other students”; α = .87) and five-items from the Conduct 
Problems scale (e.g., “Often loses temper”, “Often fights with other students or bullies 
them”; α = .80). Teachers responded to each item on a 3-point scale, 0 = not true, 1 = 
somewhat true, and 2 = certainly true.  
In the present study, correlational analyses indicated significantly strong positive 
associations between the CBS and SDQ measures for prosocial items (r(187) = .90, p < 
.001) and between the antisocial items (r(187) = .88, p < .001). Subsequently, the two 
measures were combined to create two subscales to represent moral behaviour: prosocial 
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behaviour (13 items; eight items from the CBS and five items from the SDQ) and 
antisocial behaviour (14 items; nine items from the CBS and five items from the SDQ). 
An average score was computed for each subscale with higher scores representing either 
higher levels of prosocial behaviour or antisocial behaviour. For the complete scale, see 
Appendix C. Internal consistencies were high for both overall prosocial and antisocial 
behaviours, α = .95 and α = .94 respectively. Similar to previous studies (e.g., Hardy, 
Bean, & Olsen, 2015; Vandell et al., 2006), sample mean for prosocial behaviour (M = 
1.61, SD = .43) was higher than for antisocial behaviour (M = .20, SD = .37).  
Parent-child relationship quality. For details on this measure, see Chapter I. 
Social desirability. For details on this measure, see Chapter I.  
Results 
 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to identify if self-importance of moral 
values, gender, social desirability, ethnicity, and/or SES were to be included as control 
variables in the main analyses (see Table 7). All bivariate correlations between study 
variables can be found in Table 8. Tests of normality indicated some measures were 
positively skewed, but most assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity 
were met. The parametric tests used below have also been demonstrated to be robust to 
violations of normality (e.g., Blanca, Alarcón, Arnau, Bono, & Bendayan, 2017; Rasch & 
Guiard, 2004). 
For moral identity motivation category groups, self-importance of moral values, 
gender, social desirability, ethnicity, and SES were unrelated to moral identity 
motivation. As such, no control variables were used in the main analyses involving moral 
identity motivation.  
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For moral behaviour, SES was significantly related to antisocial behaviour and 
gender was significantly related to both types of moral behaviours. Females had higher 
scores in prosocial behaviour than males, whereas males had higher scores in aggression 
compared to females. The self-importance of moral values, social desirability, and 
ethnicity, by contrast, were unrelated to moral behaviour. Both SES and gender were 
used as control variables in the main analyses predicting moral behaviour.   
Moral Identity Motivation and Age  
 
Similar to previous research (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017; Sengsavang et al., 
2015), in order to investigate age-related differences in moral identity motivation across 
social contexts, a mixed model multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
conducted with repeated measures of moral identity motivation (external, relationship-
oriented, internal) in three social contexts (family, friends, school), as well as the three 
age groups (middle childhood, early adolescence, mid-adolescence) as between-subjects 
factor. For bivariate correlations between age and all motivation coding categories, see 
Table 9. This MANOVA procedure yielded a significant main effect of motivation (see 
Table 10). However, this main effect was qualified by two significant Two-Way 
interactions: (a) an interaction between moral identity motivation and age group and (b) 
an interaction between moral identity motivation and social contexts. Thus, participants’ 
moral identity motivation varied by age as well as by social contexts (family, friends, 
school).5  
                                               
5 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the main effect of motivation, 
c2 (2) = 45.22, p < .001, and the interaction between motivation and social contexts, c2 (9) = 61.68, p < 
.001. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests (∈	= .82, .86 respectively) yielded slightly different degrees of 
freedom and F-values, but all p-values remained the same at p < .001.  
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Differences between age groups for moral identity motivation (averaged across 
contexts) were followed up by univariate ANOVAs and post-hoc tests (Scheffé; p < .05). 
For external moral identity motivation, significant differences were found between age 
groups, F(2, 184) = 6.01, p = .003, h2p = .06 (see Table 11). Participants in middle 
childhood scored the highest in external moral identity motivation and significantly 
differed from participants in mid-adolescence (p = .008, CI[.01, .12], d = .62), who 
scored the lowest. Moreover, participants in early adolescence and mid-adolescence 
significantly differed from each other (p = .015, CI[.01, .12], d = .53) with the oldest age 
group scoring the lowest in external moral identity motivation. As such, it seems that 
external moral identity motivation decreases with age. For the sum of responses for 
external moral identity motivation category groups by age group, see Figure 2. 
For relationship-oriented moral identity motivation, significant differences 
between age groups emerged, F(2, 184) = 10.00, p < .001, h2p = .10 (see Table 11). 
Participants in middle childhood scored the highest in relationship-oriented motivation 
and significantly differed from the oldest age group as mid-adolescents scored the lowest 
(p < .001, CI[.11, .37], d = .77). Participants in middle childhood and early adolescence 
were marginally different from each other (p = .054, CI[-.00, .25], d = .43), with the 
youngest age group scoring higher in relationship-oriented moral identity motivation. It 
appears that relationship-oriented moral identity motivation decreases with age.  
For internal moral identity motivation, again, significant differences between age 
groups were found, F(2, 184) = 14.21, p < .001, h2p = .13 (see Table 11). The youngest 
age group scored the lowest in internal moral identity motivation and marginally differed 
from participants in early adolescence (p = .082, CI[-.08, .00], d = .40). The oldest age 
MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT                                                                     54 
group scored significantly higher than participants in both middle childhood (p < .001, 
CI[.05, .14], d = .98) as well as participants in early adolescence (p = .008, CI[.01, .10], d 
= .56). Evidently, internal moral identity motivation appears to increase with age. For the 
sum of responses for internal moral identity motivation category groups by age group, see 
Figure 3. 
Mean differences of moral identity motivation by context are summarized in 
Table 5. Internal moral identity motivation was most salient in the family and friends 
contexts, whereas both external and internal moral identity motivation were salient in the 
school context. In terms of moral identity motivation, pairwise comparisons with a 
Bonferroni correction showed that external moral identity motivation in the school 
context was significantly higher than both the family context, p < .001, CI[.26, .49], d = 
.65, and the friends context, p < .001, CI[.46, .72], d = 1.13; external moral identity 
motivation in the family context was significantly higher than in the friends context, p < 
.001, CI[.12, .32], d = .47. Relationship-oriented moral identity motivation in the friends 
context was significantly higher than the family context, p = .004, CI[.04, .27], d = .31 
and the school context, p < .001, CI[.32, .50], d = 94; relationship-oriented moral identity 
motivation in the family context was significantly higher than in the school context, p < 
.001, CI[.16, .35], d = .59. Thus, participants reported the highest levels of external moral 
identity motivation in the school context compared to the other contexts and the highest 
levels of relationship-oriented moral identity motivation in first the friends context 
followed by the family context.  
In terms of context, pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction showed 
that in the family context, internal moral identity motivation was significantly higher than 
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both external moral identity motivation, p < .001, CI[.33, .70], d = .81, and relationship-
oriented moral identity motivation, p < .001, CI[.33, .67], d = .80. In the friends context, 
internal moral identity motivation was significantly higher than both external moral 
identity motivation, p < .001, CI[.58, .91], d = 1.25, and relationship-oriented moral 
identity motivation, p < .001, CI[.16, .55], d = .57, while relationship-oriented motivation 
was significantly higher than external motivation, p < .001, CI[.27, .51], d = .88. Finally, 
in the school context, relationship-oriented moral identity motivation was significantly 
lower than both external motivation, p < .001, CI[-.74, -.48], d = 1.19, and internal 
motivation, p < .001, CI[-.79, -.47], d = 1.06. Thus, within the family and friends context, 
only internal moral identity motivation was referred to most, whereas in the school 
context, both internal and external moral identity motivation were more salient.  
Effects of Parent-Child Relationship Quality 
  
 To investigate the effect of parent-child relationship quality (parental support, 
parent-child negative interaction) on moral identity motivation, multiple regression 
analyses were performed separately for each moral identity motivation category group 
combined across the social contexts (external, relationship-oriented, internal). Parental 
support and parent-child negative interaction were entered in Step 1 followed by SES as 
the control variable in Step 2. Findings from these regressions are summarized in Table 
12. Parental support and parent-child negative interaction were not significant predictors 
in any of the moral identity motivation category groups.   
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Moral Identity Motivation and Moral Behaviour  
To examine how moral identity motivation predicts moral behaviour, multiple 
regressions were performed separately for each type of moral behaviour (prosocial and 
antisocial). First, moral identity motivation (external, relationship-oriented, internal) was 
entered in Step 1, followed by SES and gender as control variables entered in Step 2. 
Findings from these regressions are summarized in Table 13. Internal moral identity 
motivation was a significant negative predictor of antisocial behaviour (β = -.19, p = 
.030, B = -.65, 95% CI [-.1.24, -.06], ΔR2 = .07) above and beyond SES and gender. 
Relationship-oriented moral identity motivation was a marginally significant positive 
predictor of antisocial behaviour (β = .13, p = .095, B = .16, 95% CI [-.03, .34], ΔR2 = 
.07). By contrast, external moral identity motivation was unrelated to both types of moral 
behaviour. 
Discussion 
The present study was designed to examine age-related differences in moral 
identity motivation across middle childhood and adolescence to better understand the 
development of moral identity at the second layer of McAdams’ (2009) personality 
theory. As expected, it was found that moral identity motivation varied by both age and 
social contexts most relevant to this age period (family, friends, school). First, both 
external and relationship-oriented moral identity motivation decreased with age, while 
internal moral identity motivation increased with age. Moral identity motivation was 
context-specific such that levels of internal, external, and relationship-oriented moral 
identity motivation differed depending on whether the context was family, friends, or 
school. Finally, moral identity motivation was unrelated to parent-child relationship 
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quality, and there was a negative relationship between internal moral identity motivation 
and antisocial behaviour. In the following, these findings and their implications are 
discussed in detail.  
 Similar to previous research, the overall age-related trends of moral identity 
motivation are consistent with Self-Determination Theory such that there appears to be a 
developmental trend towards higher levels of self-integration or internal motivation from 
middle childhood to adolescence. Moreover, moral identity motivation is indeed flexible 
and context-dependent as previous research suggests, given the present study’s finding of 
differential patterns of motivation in the three contexts of family, friends, and school. 
Extending and replicating Renaud-Dubé et al.’s (2010) research on autonomous 
environmental motivation and Krettenauer and Victor’s (2017) research on moral identity 
motivation, increases in internal moral identity motivation occurs prior to adolescence 
and is most salient in contexts of family and friends, while external moral identity 
motivation was highest in the school context compared to the other two contexts. The 
study’s findings were statistically significant, but they also have important practical 
significance given that nine percent of the variance was accounted for by the age and 
motivation interaction, while 53 percent of the variance was accounted for by the context 
and motivation interaction. Therefore, while motivation importantly varies by age and 
context (all effect sizes of Cohen’s d were medium to large), social contexts especially 
impacts an individual’s moral identity motivation. Theoretically, this confirms the 
developmental nature of moral identity motivation that moves towards more internal 
modes of self-regulation and integration, but age is not the only factor that is impacting 
its development. Practically, this means that with age, moral identity motivation becomes 
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more internal overall but interventions aimed to promote moral behaviour and moral 
motivation should especially consider how the social contexts can influence one’s 
motivations and thus moral behaviour. In particular, educators need to be cognizant of 
promoting more internal modes of motivation in the school environment given that 
internal motivation has been a stronger predictor of various actual behaviour—including 
moral behaviour as the present study demonstrated—than external motivation (for an 
overview, see Deci & Ryan, 2012).   
Krettenauer and Victor (2017) did not find age-related differences in relationship-
oriented moral identity motivation across adolescence to adulthood, whereas the present 
study found a decrease in this type of motivation from middle childhood to adolescence. 
The difference in these findings is likely due to the different developmental periods under 
study. Given the younger sample of the present study, it was unsurprising that 
relationship-oriented moral identity motivation was highest in the friends context given 
that peer relationships tend to increase in importance and intimacy during middle 
childhood and adolescence, but especially in middle childhood when social hierarchies of 
power and popularity are most salient (for an overview, see Parker, Rubin, Erath, 
Wojslawowicz, & Buskirk, 2006). It is probable that moral identity motivation in the 
friends context is less stable over time compared to the family and school (which would 
later be work) contexts given that the importance of friends is most significant during 
childhood and adolescence, whereas other relationships such as romantic relationships 
become increasingly important in adulthood. For example, moral identity motivation 
might fluctuate from external to relationship-oriented to internal within the friends 
context overtime, but individuals also develop new friendships or have the same long 
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lasting friendships across the lifespan and thus motivations may or may not fluctuate. 
Overall, like previous research suggests, as individuals transition from middle childhood 
to adolescence, it appears that their commitment to goals and ideals become increasingly 
self-chosen, less externally imposed by others, and less grounded on relationship 
concerns as reflected in the current sample’s increase in internal motivation and decrease 
in both external and relationship-oriented moral identity motivation.  
 Contrary to our expectation, we did not find any significant relationships between 
moral identity motivation and parent-child relationship quality. This was the first study to 
examine the role of parenting on moral identity motivation (i.e., motives for the self-
importance of moral values), whereas previous studies on parenting and moral motivation 
examined moral motivation generally through hypothetical moral dilemmas (Malti & 
Buchmann, 2010) and explicit motives for engaging in prosocial behaviour and avoiding 
antisocial behaviour (Sengsavang et al., 2015). Moreover, in Malti and Buchmann (2010) 
the quality of parent-child relationship quality amongst 15-year-olds and 21-year-olds 
was a combination of self-ratings and primary-caregiver ratings of the same items rather 
than only derived from self-reports. Thus, the lack of findings in the present study could 
be attributable to measurement differences. Unlike Malti and Buchmann (2010), this 
study also did not take into account the effect of friendship quality on moral identity 
motivation nor did either study examine teacher-student relationship quality, which may 
be important contributors to moral identity motivation during this period. From a 
developmental perspective, this transition period from middle childhood and adolescence 
may encompass other important relationships (e.g., teachers, coaches, siblings) that are 
more influential to an individual’s moral identity motivation compared to the parent-child 
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relationship. Finally, the role of parent-child relationship quality on moral identity 
motivation might be more important for females than for males. Past research has 
documented gender differences in moral motivation (e.g., Malti & Buchmann, 2010; 
Malti et al., 2009; Nunner-Winkler, Meyer-Nikele, & Wohlrab, 2007), and although the 
present study did not find any gender differences in moral motivation, follow-up analyses 
indicated that parental support positively predicted internal moral identity motivation for 
females (b = .25, p < .05), but not for males. Perhaps other relationships are more 
important in shaping male’s moral identity motivation during this sensitive period 
between middle childhood and adolescence. Evidently, further research on how gender, 
parent-child relationship, as well as friendship and teacher-student relationship quality 
affects moral identity motivation is needed. 
 Despite the theoretical connection between moral motivation and moral 
behaviour, few empirical studies have examined this relation. The present study adds to 
the limited literature by examining type of motivation (rather than overall moral 
motivation) and prosocial and antisocial behaviour (rather than only prosocial behaviour). 
As hypothesized, above and beyond gender and parental SES, internal moral identity 
motivation was a negative predictor of antisocial behaviour, while relationship-oriented 
moral identity motivation positively predicted antisocial behaviour. In line with past 
research that has demonstrated internal motivation as a stronger predictor of behaviour 
compared to external motivation in areas of prosocial behaviour, health behaviour, and 
academic behaviours (for an overview, see Deci & Ryan, 2012), external moral identity 
motivation was not a significant predictor of moral behaviour, whereas internal moral 
identity motivation was predictive of antisocial behaviour. This finding was statistically 
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significant, but also suggests practical significance with its moderate effect size (r  = -.29) 
and thus interventions aimed to promote moral behaviour need to strongly consider 
internal moral motivation as a means to less antisocial behaviour. Evidently, internal 
moral motivation reflects a desire to care for others and identification with moral values 
as part of oneself, which may strengthen one’s overall motivation to behave less 
antisocially—as reflected in our findings.  
On the other hand, relationship-oriented moral identity motivation is driven by 
consequences on one’s relationships which are very important during this developmental 
age period and thus might be more similar to external motivation than internal motivation 
given the focus on consequences. In fact, as seen in Table 6, relationship-oriented moral 
identity motivation was significantly and negatively related to internal moral identity 
motivation for each context (rs ranged from -.16 to -.49, ps < .05) and across contexts 
(r(186) = -.39, p < .001). Therefore, it is not surprising that internal and relationship-
oriented moral identity motivation both predict antisocial behaviour, albeit in opposite 
ways. In order for children to become moral citizens of the future, it is vital for parents 
and educators to cultivate environments promoting and attracting children’s internal 
motivation as a means to encourage moral behaviour – especially given the practical 
significance of how context interacts with motivation. For example, teachers involved in 
the Child Development Project (CDP; see Battistich, Schaps, & Wilson, 2004), which 
was designed to promote caring learners and prosocial character, helped develop 
students’ intrinsic motivations to act cooperatively by engaging them in rule-setting, 
decision-making, and problem-solving. By offering environments focused on 
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rewards/punishments to the self and to their relationships (relationship-oriented), children 
are less likely to be prosocial and more likely to engage in antisocial behaviours.  
 This study was not without limitations. The main limitations were discussed in 
Chapter I (i.e., cross-sectional design, limited age-range, public versus catholic school 
boards, self-reports of parent-child relationship quality, and sample was predominately of 
European descent), but there are some specific limitations related to the present study. 
First, moral behaviour was assessed by teacher-reports, but there may be differences in 
the degree to which elementary school teachers and high school teachers engage with 
their students. More specifically, high school students have several teachers throughout 
the day, whereas elementary school students spend much more time with their homeroom 
teacher. In similar vein, background demographics of teachers (e.g., years of experience) 
were not collected, which has implications for how well they may engage or know how to 
evaluate students’ social behaviours. Teachers with less experience may not adequately 
or confidently know how to assess students’ social behaviours compared to teachers with 
many years of experience and thus the assessments of moral behaviour in the present 
study may not accurately represent participants’ actual moral behaviour. Future research 
ought to collect demographic information on teachers as well as assess high school 
students’ moral behaviour through reports from multiple teachers rather than only one to 
provide a more accurate assessment of behaviour. Finally, given that aspects of morality 
appears to be context-dependent, moral behaviour may also vary from context to context 
and the present study only measured moral behaviour in one context (school). Thus, 
future research may aim to measure moral behaviour in different contexts (family, 
friends) to examine if one’s moral actions differ depending on the social context and who 
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is assessing the behaviour (e.g., parent, teacher, peers). It is possible that moral identity 
motivation is more predictive of moral behaviour in some contexts (e.g., family and 
friends) than others (e.g., school, community), which may also change over time. 
 Overall, the present study adds an important contribution to the literature by 
examining moral identity motivation from middle childhood to adolescence. In particular, 
moral identity motivation differs depending on the social context and its development is 
not limited to adolescence and beyond. The present study provides evidence that moral 
identity motivation can be studied with younger samples by using an open-ended 
qualitative approach to understanding children’s and adolescent’s motivations that indeed 
vary from context to context. Evidently, it is imperative that developmental research and 
theory on moral identity motivation consider both age and social contexts, especially 
given that its development appears to be more complex than simply stating that internal 
motivation increases and external motivation decreases with age. Overall, by providing 
environments (especially the school environment) that attract and promote internal 
motivation and self-regulation while children age, we are more likely to cultivate moral 
citizens of the future. Given especially the current political climate and thus the 
continuous aspiration for moral citizens, moral identity motivation should continue to be 
studied as well as encouraged and discussed by parents and educators as an important 
goal of moral development to better foster engagement in moral actions among children 
and students.  
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CHAPTER III: Moral Identity Development through Reflections on Past (Im)Moral 
Experiences 
In recent years, narrative approaches have become more popular as a means to 
understanding personality – including aspects of moral identity – by examining 
integrative life narratives or the life story, which is the third layer of McAdams’ (2009) 
three-layer model of personality. Beyond the trait layer (first layer) and characteristic 
adaptations layer (second layer) of personality, moral identity is also reflected in the life 
stories individuals tell. According to Erikson (1959/1980), an individual’s identity affords 
a sense of stability or connection over time as they integrate their past experiences with 
present concerns and future plans and goals. This notion best elucidates this third layer of 
personality and specifically, moral identity, by highlighting the important role of an 
individual’s life story or past life narratives in shaping one’s identity (see also McAdams, 
2001; McLean & Pasupathi, 2012).  
Narratives about past experiences and events – and thus the interpretation and 
construction of these narratives – can typically be seen to either confirm one’s self-view 
or challenge it (for a review, see Pasupathi, Mansour, & Brubaker, 2007). At the same 
time, narrative research has also revealed that lessons learned (i.e., change in behaviour 
caused by past event) and gaining insight (i.e., change in one’s self-understanding or self-
view beyond the past event itself) are two types of meaning making that individuals have 
when reflecting on past experiences (see McLean 2005; McLean & Thorne, 2003). This 
ability to form self-event connections or connecting past experiences or actions to the 
present self is an important aspect of identity development (e.g., Krettenauer & Mosleh, 
2013; McLean & Pasupathi, 2012; McLean & Pratt, 2006). Overall, self-event 
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connections in one’s narratives about past events appears to increase with age from early 
adulthood to young adulthood (Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006). This mechanism of identity 
development has also been empirically applied to moral identity development, 
specifically how individuals connect narratives about past moral and immoral behaviours 
to their present sense of self (Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013; Recchia et al., 2015).  
Developmental research suggests that the life story becomes integrated into 
personality and is considered a developmental achievement that begins with the 
biological, social, and cognitive transitions of adolescence (e.g., Habermas & de Silveira, 
2008; Reese et al., 2014). Although life stories become more connected or reflective of 
one’s sense of self during adolescence and emerging adulthood (Habermas & Bluck, 
2000; Habermas & Reese, 2015), children as young as five years are able to narrate and 
construct meaningful accounts of episodes or events of their lives (e.g., Fivush & Nelson, 
2004; Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010b), including morally-laden experiences of helping and 
harming others (e.g., Recchia et al., 2015; Recchia, Wainryb, & Pasupathi, 2013; 
Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2018). Narrative accounts about children’s and adolescents’ own 
past moral achievements (i.e., helping others) and failures (i.e., harming others) can aid in 
understanding their own interpretations and representations of these experiences; 
specifically their thoughts, emotions, and more importantly, their motivation behind these 
behaviours (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010a; Recchia et al., 2015; Wainryb, Brehl, & 
Matwin, 2005). At the same time, as individuals reflect on and interpret these narrative 
accounts of past moral behaviour, it may “encourage and facilitates the development of a 
more mature sense of how one’s morally relevant actions are based in goals and beliefs 
(i.e., a sense of moral agency)” (Tappan, 2010, p. 81), while also negotiating the extent of 
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their moral responsibilities (Tappan, 2010). More specifically, when an individual 
reflects on the consequences of their actions (e.g., emotions evoked from the self, as well 
as the emotional or behavioural response of the other person), this aids in the 
development and construction of their moral self or moral identity given that it allows the 
individual to understand how they want to be and who they want to be as a moral person. 
Arguably, narratives reflect children’s current moral understanding, while also 
prospectively shaping new understandings that cannot be captured from other approaches 
such as self-report questionnaires (Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2018). During middle 
childhood and adolescence, children are developing more sophisticated understandings of 
themselves and others, while also becoming more skilled in reflecting on the 
psychological features of their experiences (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010a; Recchia et al., 
2015). Evidently, the way they perceive and interpret past experiences may change over 
time.   
There have been several empirical studies examining age-related and context-
dependent differences in how children and adolescents narrate past (im)moral behaviours. 
For example, Recchia et al., (2015) found meaningful asymmetries in children’s and 
adolescents’ past experiences of helping and harming in the context of friends, such that 
reasons in the harmful context was both self- and other-focused, whereas reasons in the 
helping narratives were mainly other-focused across middle childhood and adolescence. 
In terms of age-related differences, Recchia et al. (2015) found that participants of all 
ages highlighted the negative consequences of harming others, yet younger children were 
less likely to consider the positive consequences of helping others. Proulx and Chandler 
(2009) proposed a general developmental trend of adolescents’ self-views that reflect 
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increased context dependency with age such that one narrates their bad behaviours as 
externally motivated, while viewing their good behaviours as internally motivated. On 
the other hand, Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013) found participants with higher levels of 
internal motivation and older participants (adults compared to adolescents) had more self-
event connections such that they were more likely to make a connection between past 
(im)moral and their present self. In the aforementioned studies, there were two moral 
contexts of prosocial and antisocial behaviours, but only one social context was 
investigated (Recchia et al., 2015) or social context was not examined at all (Krettenauer 
& Mosleh, 2013; Proulx & Chandler, 2009).  
Recchia and colleagues (2013) examined narrative accounts of harming 
experiences in two social contexts (i.e., siblings and friends) and demonstrated how these 
two social contexts are distinct for sociomoral development. For instance, they found 
social context or relationship differences in participants’ reasons for harm such that harm 
against siblings was based on emotional/impulsive reasons and provocation (i.e., 
offensive behaviour or property-related issues), whereas harm against friends was due to 
relationship-oriented concerns such as trust and desire for connectedness, as well as more 
benign behaviours (i.e., benevolent reasons such a prosocial intent and extenuating 
circumstances). In terms of age-related differences, Recchia et al. (2013) found that 7-
year-olds described mutual harm more often with siblings compared to friends (though 
this was not apparent among 11-year-olds or 16-year-olds), while narrative accounts of 
harming siblings and friends became somewhat more similar with age (e.g., children are 
increasingly able to recognize the hurtful consequences of their behaviour). Moreover, 
experiences of harm became more psychologically based with age as participants 
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increasingly made references to the cognition of the victim. Given the importance and 
difference in social contexts (siblings versus friends), as well as the two dimensions of 
moral action (harmful and helpful), it is imperative that individual differences in 
children’s and adolescents’ experiences of harming and helping are investigated 
separately for the friends context and the family context to further understand how 
individuals differentially narrate their past (im)moral actions depending on social context 
and moral context. 
To date, no studies have compared these two moral contexts as well as these two 
social contexts in children and adolescents. Furthermore, by using the narrative approach 
to moral identity (layer three of personality) that has been used in the past, we were able 
to investigate the ways in which children versus adolescents connect morally relevant 
experiences to their sense of self and reveal moral motivations in their narratives. In sum, 
the purpose of this study was to extend previous research by examining both types of 
contexts, as well as investigating children’s and adolescents’ narrative descriptions of the 
(1) type of harmful and helpful behaviours, (2) their motivations or reasons for engaging 
in these behaviours, and (3) the extent to which they describe how the past morally 
relevant experience connects to their present self. Based on the lack of research 
examining moral contexts and social contexts in narratives, it may be premature to offer 
specific hypotheses. Broadly, context was expected to impact how children and 
adolescents narrate and understand their past (im)moral experiences, while the ability to 
draw stronger connections between past events and the current self was expected to 
increase with age. As such, the present study provided increased richness to 
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understanding moral identity development by examining how children and adolescents 
construe and interpret their past (im)moral experiences.  
Method 
 
Sample, Measures and Procedures   
 
 The sample was the same as Chapter II with 188 participants (101 females) given 
that two interviews from the original N = 190 (Chapter I) were unscorable, for more 
details on the sample and recruitment, see Chapters I and II, as well as Table 3 for a 
summary of all demographic variables by age group. The present study included a mixed-
method cross-sectional design with a 45-minute semi-structured interviews and a 15-
minute self-report questionnaire. This study was part of a larger mixed-method cross-
sectional and multi-informant study (Chapters I and II) and thus only procedures and 
measures relevant to the present study are discussed.  
Children and adolescents were interviewed individually in a private room at the 
child’s school or a university’s laboratory. The Moral Identity Interview assessed the 
different layers of moral identity across social contexts. For more details on the earlier 
portions of the interview, see Chapter I (self-importance of moral values) and Chapter II 
(moral identity motivation). After the self-importance of moral values and moral identity 
motivation parts of the interview were over, similar to Recchia and colleagues (2013, 
2015) who interviewed children and adolescents, each participant was asked to provide a 
narrative account of a time when they hurt or upset someone in their family (“Tell me 
about a time when you did or said something that ended up hurting or upsetting someone 
in your family”), and then to provide a narrative account of a time when they helped 
someone in their family (“Tell me about a time when you did or said something that 
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ended up helping someone in your family”). The ordering of the moral context (harming 
versus helping) was based on computer randomization for each participant in order to 
control for order effects of the moral context. This process was then repeated for the 
friends context (“Tell me about a time when you did or said something that ended up 
hurting or upsetting [helping] one of your friends”).  
Participants were provided a worksheet and instructed to think of some situations 
for that type of event and then to briefly write down some keywords. If participants could 
not come up with situations or experiences, the interviewer expressed to participants that 
the event did not have to be recent nor did it have to be a big event. Once completed, the 
interviewer asked the participant to narrate an account of one specific episode for that 
type of event that stands out most to them. The interviewer encouraged elaboration with 
follow-up prompts (e.g., “That’s interesting, tell me more about that”, “How did you feel 
when that happened?”, “So we’ve talked about what you experienced from this, but how 
did the other person react?”). Interviews were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim for 
analysis.   
Social desirability. For details on this measure, see Chapter I. 
Coding and Reliability  
 
Coding categories were deductively informed from past research examining moral 
narratives of helping and harming with children and adolescents (Recchia et al., 2015), as 
well as research examining autobiographical memories about past moral and immoral 
actions (Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013). The following coding categories derived from 
Recchia et al. (2013, 2015) and Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013) were used as a 
framework for the present study: type of harmful and helpful actions, the narrator’s 
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reasons for engaging in harmful or helpful action, as well as self-event connection. As the 
first study to examine both moral contexts and social contexts of narratives among 
children and adolescents, these coding categories were chosen for the framework to 
describe the narratives overall as well as to examine the narrator’s strength of self-event 
connection. A subset of 47 transcripts (25% of total sample) was randomly selected 
across the age groups and periods of the data collection to determine agreement between 
two independent coders. Discrepancies between coders were discussed until consensus 
was reached. For type of harmful and helpful actions, inter-coder agreement was κ = .86; 
for the narrator’s reasons for harming or helping, it was κ = .81; for self-event 
connection, it was κ = .73. Establishing inter-coder agreement took approximately one 
month (November 6, 2017 to December 12, 2017) and then one coder completed coding 
the remaining transcripts (n = 141) within one month following establishing inter-coder 
reliability.  
 Types of harmful and helpful actions. Each narrative was coded for the 
presence (1) or absence (0) of three possible types of actions: (a) material or concrete 
forms of harming or helping (e.g., refusal to share, helping with schoolwork), (b) physical 
forms of harming or helping (e.g., hitting, helping with injury), and (c) psychological or 
emotional forms of harming or helping (e.g., teasing, gossiping, helping someone feel 
better after a bad day).   
 Types of reasons for harm or help. Each narrative was coded for the presence 
(1) or absence (0) of references to five possible reasons for engaging in harmful or 
helpful behaviour: (a) external motivation or constraints (e.g., parents’ directives), (b) 
self-interested or narrator’s perspective (e.g., pursuit of an instrumental goal), (c) other-
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interested or other’s perspective (e.g., prosocial intent), (d) response to other’s actions 
(e.g., driven by anger), and (e) unintentional (e.g., accident). Similar to Sengsavang et al. 
(2015) and Chapter II, if a participant articulated more than one motive for why he or she 
engaged in the harmful or helpful event, all motives were coded separately. As such, 
multiple codings were possible which reduced linear dependency between codes. 
 Strength of self-event connection. Each narrative was coded for the extent of 
self-related insights or self-event connection, which was originally adapted from 
narrative research (Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006; Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010b) and 
utilized by Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013). The strength of these self-event connections 
reflected the extent to which the past event or past experience was connected to the 
narrator’s current self. Following Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013), there were five coding 
categories for self-event connection: no self-event connection, dismissal, implicit self-
event connection, explicit self-event connection: confirming self-concept, and explicit 
self-event connection: changing self-concept. 
 No self-event connection showed a lack of thought about the meaning and 
relevance of the event for the narrator’s current self. The participant spent little or no time 
reflecting on this event prior to the interview. For example: 
After I felt pretty good and it wasn't as bad as I thought it was going to be and I 
could tell that it really helped my mom out because she had a lot on her 
plate…(Interviewer: OK and if a similar situation came up what would you do?) I 
would help her out again because I know that we have some family friends 
coming over again in February, so I'll help out again. (ID119, Grade 8, female, 
13-years-old) 
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A dismissal revealed that the event was unimportant to the self in which case the 
participant clearly dismissed the event. There was little to no evidence of the event 
having any effect on the narrator’s current self. For example: “It's in the past, so I say it's 
in the past, it doesn’t matter anymore.” (ID016, Grade 4, female, 9-years-old) 
 Implicit self-event connection was apparent when participants showed evidence of 
some reflection about the event, but no direct connection between the narrator’s current 
self and the event. The event may have continued to work its way into the participant’s 
consciousness and/or captures a recurring theme/behaviour, however an explicit 
connection between self and event was not made. For example, “I think about it. It still 
hurts but now it doesn’t, it’s not as bad.” (ID168, Grade 11, female, 16-years-old)  
 Explicit self-event connection showed that the event had a significant impact to 
the narrator’s current self by either confirming or changing one’s self-view. The impact 
goes beyond the immediate situation and appeared to have a lasting effect and still 
relevant today. An example of an explicit confirming self-event connection:  
Sometimes I feel like I’m a miracle worker with people, because they – my friends 
–they’re so dramatic – they always get into like fights…I feel like I’m a miracle 
worker. I can work things out between them. So yes, I felt good…I [still] feel like 
a miracle worker. (ID161, Grade 10, female, 15-years-old) 
An example of an explicit changing self-event connection: 
Sometimes I really wish I didn’t have to do this and I wish that, people could 
figure this out by themselves or at least try to understand. But then I always 
remember back to how not everyone thinks the same way and for some people it’s 
just so much harder to try and see someone else’s perspective and so I always 
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think back how it’s actually a blessing or a gift of some kind that at least I am 
someone who is able to understand other people’s perspective and so I feel like 
it’s almost a responsibility of mine to just be there to help out…I’ve grown into 
this position of being a person who is always kind of there as the middle person. 
(ID171, Grade 10, female, 15-years-old) 
 
Similar to Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013), codes were further combined given 
that some categories were rare for some events. Dismissals were rarely evident in the 
helping narratives (0% -1.1%) and with low frequency in the harming narratives (10.5%-
14.2%). Therefore, dismissals were combined with no self-event connection (see also 
Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013; Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006). For harmful narratives, rarely 
were explicit confirming self-event connections made (1.1% for both social contexts) and 
for helpful narratives, rarely were explicit changing self-event connections made (1.1% 
and 1.6% respectively for the family and friends contexts). Thus, like Krettenauer and 
Mosleh (2013), both categories of explicit self-event connection were combined to 
represent overall explicit self-event connection. Following Krettenauer and Mosleh 
(2013), codes were further combined for data analyses to represent categories of 
increasing articulateness of self-event connection: no self-event connection or dismissal 
(0) at the lower end of the scale, explicit self-event connection (2) at the higher end of the 
scale, and implicit self-event connection in between (1). On average, the strength of the 
self-event connection was M = 0.56, SD = .59 for the harmful narratives and M = 0.39, 
SD = .61 for the helpful narratives on a scale that ranged from 0 to 2. 
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Results 
The primary goal was to examine age-related differences in how children and 
adolescents narrate their past (im)moral experiences. First, preliminary analyses were 
conducted to identify if any potential confound variables (i.e., social desirability, gender, 
ethnicity, SES) related to age would be included as control variables in the main analyses. 
In the present sample, both social desirability and SES were related to age and thus we 
examined if these two variables were correlated with the narrative outcome variables. 
Social desirability was negatively and significantly related to self-interested reasons for 
harmful and helpful actions. On the other hand, SES was positively and significantly 
related to both psychological or emotional types of harmful and helpful actions and 
strength of self-event connection. Thus, social desirability was used as a control variable 
in the main analyses involving reasons for harmful and helpful actions, while SES was 
used as control variable in the main analyses involving type of harmful and helpful 
actions as well as self-event connection. All bivariate correlations with means and 
standard deviations can be found in Table 14.  
Analyses of narrative content (type, reasons, self-event connection) were 
conducted as a function of moral context (harm, help), social context (family, friends), 
and age group (middle childhood, early adolescence, mid-adolescence) with moral 
context and social context as the repeated measures. ANOVA-based procedures were 
used given that this technique has been demonstrated to be acceptable for analyzing this 
type of data (see Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001). Tests of normality indicated 
some of the measures were skewed, but these parametric tests have been demonstrated to 
be robust to violations of normality (e.g., Blanca et al., 2017; Rasch & Guiard, 2004). All 
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F-values reported are based on Pillai’s Trace test statistic given that it is considered the 
most robust. Other test statistics (Wilk’s Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, Roy’s Largest Root) 
yielded slightly different F-values for some interactions, but all p-values reached the 
same level of statistical significance. 
Types of Harmful and Helpful Actions 
 
A Moral Context x Social Context x Age Group mixed model multivariate 
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with contexts (harm, help, family, friends) as the 
repeated measures, the three age groups (middle childhood, early adolescence, mid-
adolescence) as the between-subjects factor, and the three types of actions 
(material/concrete, physical, psychological/emotional) as dependent variables was 
performed, while controlling for SES.6 The MANCOVA revealed significant main effects 
of type, F(2, 152) = 95.42, p < .001, h2p = .56, and social context, F(1, 153) = 9.13, p = 
.003, h2p = .06, as well as a marginally significant main effect of age group, F(2, 152) = 
2.65, p = .074, h2p = .03. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons (ps < .001, Bonferroni 
corrected) revealed that psychological or emotion forms (M = .65, SD = .02) of harm/help 
were described more than both material or concrete forms (M = .25, SD = .02) and 
physical forms (M = .19, SD = .02). These main effects, however, were qualified by three 
significant two-way interactions: Type x Age Group, F(4, 306) = 3.61, p = .007, h2p = 
.05, Type x Moral Context, F(2, 152) = 56.10, p < .001, h2p = .42, and Type x Social 
Context, F(2, 152) = 4.59, p = .012, h2p = .06. 
                                               
6 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the main effect of type, c2 (2) 
= .91, p = .001. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests (∈	= .92) yielded slightly different degrees of freedom, 
but the F-value and p-value remained the same. 
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Differences between age group for types of harmful and helpful actions (averaged 
across contexts) were followed up by univariate ANOVAs and post-hoc tests (Scheffé; p 
< .05). Results revealed significant differences for physical forms, F(2, 183) = 6.11 p = 
.003, h2p = .06, and for psychological or emotional forms, F(2, 183) = 6.44, p = .002, h2p 
= .07 (see Table 15). For physical forms of harm/help, participants in the youngest age 
group of middle childhood scored the highest and significantly differed from participants 
in early adolescence (p = .029, CI[.03, .79], d = .44) and mid-adolescence (p = .006, 
CI[.13, .92], d = .60). For psychological or emotional forms, participants in middle 
childhood scored the lowest and significantly differed from the oldest age group of mid-
adolescence (p = .002, CI[.22, 1.23], d = .66) and marginally from participants in early 
adolescence (p = .07, CI[-.03, .95], d = .38). Thus, physical forms of harm/help appear to 
decrease with age, while psychological or emotional forms of harm/help appear to 
increase during this period.  
Mean differences of type of harm/help by moral context are summarized in Table 
16. Psychological or emotional forms was most salient in the harmful context (M = 1.52, 
SD = .64) and in the helpful context, psychological or emotional forms (M = .91, SD = 
.80) and material or concrete forms (M = .82, SD = .75) were equally salient. Pairwise 
comparisons (t-tests, p < .003) yielded significant differences between the harmful and 
helpful contexts for all types of harm/help. Thus, participants made more references to 
material or concrete types of actions in the help narratives than for harm narratives (p < 
.001, CI[.48, .72], d = .96), engaged in more physical types of actions in the help than 
harm narratives (p = .002, CI[.07, .28], d = .30), as well as had more psychological or 
MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT                                                                     78 
emotional types of actions in the harm than help narratives (p < .001, CI[.48, .73], d = 
.84).  
Mean differences of type of harm/help by social context are summarized in Table 
17. In terms of type, pairwise comparisons (t-tests, p < .001) yielded significant 
differences only for the material or concrete type of harm/help such that participants 
reported higher levels of this type of harm/help in the family context compared to the 
friends context (p < .001, CI[.12, .34], d = .88). In terms of social contexts, pairwise 
comparisons with a Bonferroni correction showed that in the family context, participants 
reported significantly more psychological or emotional harm/help compared to material 
or concrete (p < .001, CI[.35, .77], d = .83) and physical types of harm/help (p < .001, 
CI[.60, .99], d = 1.23). Moreover, participants reported significantly more material or 
concrete harm/help than physical harm/help (p = .004, CI[.06, .41], d = .38). In the 
friends context, psychological or emotional harm/help was reported significantly more 
often than both material or concrete (p < .001, CI[.66, 1.05], d = 1.34) and physical 
harm/help (p < .001, CI[.71, 1.11], d = 1.42). 
Reasons for Engaging in Harmful and Helpful Actions 
 
A Moral Context x Social Context x Age Group mixed model MANCOVA with 
contexts (harm, help, family, friends) as the repeated measures, the three age groups 
(middle childhood, early adolescence, mid-adolescence) as the between-subjects factor, 
and the five types of reasons (external constraints, self-interested, other-interested, 
response to others’ actions, and unintentional) as dependent variables was performed, 
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while controlling for social desirability.7 The MANCOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of reasons, F(4, 140) = 158.05, p < .001, h2p = .82. Post-hoc comparisons with a 
Bonferroni correction revealed that external constraints were reported significantly less 
than all other types of reasons (ps < .001). Self-interested reasons were reported 
significantly less than other-interested reasons (p = .032), but significantly higher than 
unintentional reasons (p < .001). Both other-interested and response to others’ actions 
reasons were reported significantly more than unintentional reasons (p’s < .001). For 
means and standard deviations, see Table 18.  
This main effect, however, was qualified by two significant two-way interactions: 
Reasons x Moral Context, F(4, 140) = 308.78, p < .001, h2p = .90, and Reasons x Social 
Context, F(4, 140) = 4.10, p = .004, h2p = .10. Moreover, these two-way interactions 
were qualified by a significant three-way interaction, Reasons x Moral Context x Social 
Context, F(4, 140) = 5.21, p = .001, h2p = .13. The nature of this three-way interaction is 
illustrated in Figure 4. A follow-up analysis of the pattern of means revealed that the 
difference between the family and friends context varied across reasons for action and 
moral context. In the context of harm narratives, three categories of reasons for action 
were most salient with higher levels of self-interested and response to others’ actions 
among harmful actions with the family compared to friends, while unintentional harmful 
actions were more common among friends than family. A different pattern was found in 
the context of help narratives. Here, there were only two categories of reasons for action 
                                               
7 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the main effect of reasons, c2 
(9) = .38, p < .001, and the interactions between reasons and social context, c2 (9) = .44, p < .001, reasons 
and moral context, c2 (9) = .29, p < .001, and the interaction between reasons, social context, and moral 
context, c2 (9) = .33, p < .001. Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests (∈	= .75, .78, .67, .76 respectively) 
yielded slightly different degrees of freedom, but the F-values and p-values remained the same. 
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that were most salient: other-interested and responses to others’ actions. In both 
categories, participants referred to other-interested and response to others’ actions more 
frequently with helpful actions with friends than with family. Interestingly, there were no 
unintentional reasons for helpful actions, but this was a major reason category for 
harmful actions.  
Strength of Self-Event Connections 
 
A Moral Context x Social Context x Age Group mixed model MANCOVA with 
contexts (harm, help, family, friends) as the repeated measures, the three age groups 
(middle childhood, early adolescence, mid-adolescence) as the between-subjects factor, 
and the strength of the self-event connection as the dependent variable was performed, 
while controlling for SES. The MANCOVA revealed significant main effects of age 
group, F(2, 152) = 12.46, p < .001, h2p = .14, and moral context, F(2, 153) = 8.78, p = 
.004, h2p = .05.  
Post-hoc tests (Scheffé; p < .001) revealed that the oldest age group (M = 2.93, 
SD = 2.09) had significantly higher scores in strength of self-event connection compared 
to both participants in middle childhood (M = 1.11, SD  = 1.40) (p < .001, CI[1.01, 2.63], 
d = 1.03) and participants in early adolescence (M = 1.63, SD = 1.86) (p < .001, CI[.49, 
2.10], d = .66). In order to better understand the main effect of age group on self-event 
connection, see Figure 5 for sum scores of each self-event connection category by age 
group. It is evident that no self-event connection/dismissal decreases with age, while 
implicit self-event connection, and both types of explicit self-event connection increases 
with age. In terms of moral context, post-hoc tests (t-test, p = .001, d = .30) revealed that 
the strength of self-event connection was significantly higher in the harmful narratives (M 
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= .57, SD = .59) than in the helpful narratives (M = .34, SD = .61). Therefore, self-event 
connection appears to increase with age and participants were able to draw more self-
event connections from their past harmful behaviours compared to their past helpful 
behaviours.  
Although the two categories of explicit self-event connections (confirming versus 
changing) were combined in how we measured strength of self-event connection due to 
overall low frequencies, we wanted to do a follow-up analysis and investigate age-related 
differences in these two explicit categories of self-event connections by performing a 
series of one-way ANOVAs. The rates were examined across social contexts given that 
the frequencies were quite low in some categories (e.g., 1.1% of participants indicated 
confirming one’s self-view in family harm narratives) and as such combined across the 
family and friends contexts. Results indicated that the three age groups significantly 
differed with regard to rates of confirming one’s self-view in the helpful narratives, F(2, 
181) = 5.45, p = .005, h2p = .06,  as well as in terms of the rates of changing one’s self-
view in the harmful narratives, F(2, 181) = 7.15, p = .001, h2p = .07. Post-hoc tests 
(Scheffé; p < .05) revealed that the oldest age group of mid-adolescence (M = .46, SD = 
.68) reported significantly higher rates of the past helpful event confirming one’s self-
view compared to both participants in middle childhood (M = .17, SD = .42) (p = .018, 
CI[.04, .52], d = .52) and participants in early adolescence (M = .17, SD = .49) (p = .016, 
CI[.04, .53], d = .50). A similar pattern was also found with the rates of changing one’s 
self-view in the harmful narratives such that the youngest age group had significantly 
lower rates (M = .03, SD = .18) compared to participants in early adolescence (M = .25, 
SD = .53) (p = .037, CI[.01, .43], d = .55) and participants in mid-adolescence (M = .35, 
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SD = .61) (p = .002, CI[.10, .53], d = .73). Thus, it appears that participants increasingly 
with age reported higher levels of the past helpful event confirming one’s self view, 
while also reporting higher levels of past harmful events changing one’s self-view.  
Discussion 
The present study was designed to examine age-related differences in children’s 
and adolescents’ third layer of moral identity. Specifically, we aimed to examine age 
differences in narrative descriptions of past immoral and moral actions as well as the 
extent to which children versus adolescents connect these past events to their current self. 
This was the first study to examine both moral contexts (harm, help) as well as social 
contexts (family, friends) to better understand how children and adolescents narrate and 
interpret their past moral failures and moral achievements. This novel study was 
significant given that human development is complex and it is important to study 
development in the context of multiple environments (for an overview, see 
Bronfenbrenner, 1979) because children’s and adolescents’ understanding of their past 
experiences may vary from context to context – as this study demonstrated. Replicating, 
and importantly, extending previous research, our results revealed numerous distinctions 
between narrator’s accounts of harmful and helpful actions with family and friends, 
suggesting that there are meaningful asymmetries in their experiences of these (im)moral 
events that also differ depending on the social context. In terms of age-related 
differences, our findings revealed distinct age-related patterns for the type of 
harmful/helpful actions as well as for the strength of self-event connection. Interestingly, 
the rates of explicit confirming and explicit changing self-event connections also differed 
based on age and type of moral event. Therefore, the way children and adolescents 
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construe their past morally relevant experiences evolve with age and depends on whether 
the experience was transgressive (harmful) or prosocial (helpful), as well as whether the 
event took place with their family or friends. In the following, these findings and their 
implications are discussed in detail.  
Does Context Impact How Children and Adolescents Narrate and Understand Past 
(Im)Moral Experiences?   
Previous research examining narratives about past (im)moral experiences have 
not examined the two moral contexts of harm and help, as well as the two social contexts 
of family and friends simultaneously. The present study adds unique patterns of findings 
to the literature that replicate and extend past research in a single empirical investigation, 
while also adding validity to this narrative method given that children and adolescents 
were indeed responsive to the context in mind. In terms of the moral context, what was 
most significant was how participants’ reasoning for engaging and their strength of self-
event connection changed depending on whether the action was harmful or helpful. 
Similar to Recchia et al. (2015), participants often referred to self-focused, response to 
others’ actions, and unintentional reasons for engaging in harmful behaviours, while 
referring to other-focused and response to others’ actions as reasons in the helpful 
context. This finding was somewhat in contrast to Proulx and Chandler’s (2009) finding 
of increased context dependency and multiplicity in self-constructions with age given that 
in the present study, regardless of age, participants did not only narrate their bad 
behaviours as externally provoked and good behaviours as internally motivated. The way 
participants narrate their past (im)moral behaviour appears to be more complex than what 
Proulx and Chandler (2009) originally proposed, especially given that there was no main 
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effect of age in participants’ reasons for engaging in (im)moral behaviour. It is important 
to note that participants in Proulx and Chandler’s (2009) study were asked to explain 
motivations behind the fictional character Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde rather than asking 
participants to reflect on their own past (im)moral behaviour, which could explain the 
discrepancy in findings between the studies. Our findings certainly support the notion 
that reasons or motivations for behaviour are indeed context-dependent. Therefore, 
reasons for engaging in (im)moral behaviour appear to be more dependent on the context 
in which the individual is situated in rather than the age of the individual. This 
importantly informs developmental theory such that context is an important factor when 
understanding children’s and adolescent’s reasonings for engaging in behaviour. When 
disciplining and/or rewarding children, adults need to be sure to have children actively 
reflect on their past moral and immoral behaviours separately. Consequently, children are 
likely to become more self-aware of their behaviours that are often goal-directed in some 
way, whether it be other-oriented or self-oriented, and discuss the consequences of their 
behaviours (e.g., feelings evoked from the behaviour) in order to promote future positive 
action and reflection. 
At the same time, participants were able to draw more self-event connections 
from their past harmful behaviours compared to their past helpful behaviours. Therefore, 
although harmful acts were often driven by self-interested concerns, participants were 
able to reflect more deeply on this type of past behaviour and connect them to their 
current self, compared to help narratives. This is a novel finding in the literature and 
provides important implications for moral identity development. Often researchers 
examine reasons or motivations for (im)moral behaviour, but future research should also 
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investigate how the type of (im)moral behaviour – regardless of whether the reason 
behind the act was self-oriented or other-oriented – may in fact greatly shape one’s sense 
of self and subsequent behaviour. For example, one participant described a recent time 
when she hurt her friend’s feelings because the participant revealed she was 
uncomfortable after her friend confided in her and shared a personal confession that 
occurred years prior. This was a self-focused and unintentional form of harm given that 
the participant was only focused on her own perspective and feelings, but did not intend 
to harm her friend. However, later in her narrative she explained: 
I definitely tried to explain myself [to my friend]. I think giving some time and 
some space was part of the way to help, I guess to ease the tension. But after 
reflecting on it myself and what I would do if this situation were to ever happen 
again, that was what I thought a lot about … I guess just being really sincere 
about it and telling them, I understand, actually I don’t understand but I’m 
definitely willing to accept it. I’m cool with it, that’s the best I could and can do. 
(ID171, Grade 10, female, 15-years-old) 
By reflecting on this experience, the participant connected her past behaviour to her 
present self and it helped explicitly change her self-view to be more accepting and 
understanding of others in the future. This finding was in contrast to Recchia et al. (2015) 
who found that self-event connections were more prominent in youth’s help narratives 
than harm narratives. This difference could lie in how self-event connections were coded 
in the present study compared to Recchia and colleagues. Recchia et al. (2015) coded 
self-event connections or self-related insights slightly differently than the present study 
given that their coding was also based on self-evaluations (e.g., ““I reacted wrong”” (p. 
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868)) and personally significant statements (e.g., ““It was the worst fight that I’d ever 
had”” (p. 868)), in addition to self-event connections. Therefore, Recchia et al. (2015) did 
not code strictly for self-event connection and thus their findings related to self-event 
connections also reflect self-evaluations and personal statements. The present study 
focused only on self-event connections and the degree to which the past event connected 
to the narrator’s current sense of self. It is important to also note that Recchia and 
colleagues mentioned that these self-event connections might become increasingly more 
prevalent in harm narratives in later adolescence and adulthood (see also Pasupathi & 
Mansour, 2006), which the present study supports given that our sample was slightly 
older. Nonetheless, it would be vital to extend this research from a more lifespan 
perspective by examining participants in middle childhood to adulthood.  
In terms of social context, it is well known that relationships with friends and 
relationships with family (e.g., siblings) have distinct characteristics, especially in 
childhood and adolescence. Friendships are voluntary and based on mutuality and 
reciprocity and often have greater quality and intimacy compared to family relationships 
(i.e., siblings) (see Buhrmester, 1992; Derkman, Engels, Kuntsche, van, & Scholte, 
2011). As such, close friendships are extremely important and youth aim to protect and 
maintain these relationships. On the other hand, family relationships are involuntary and 
there is less perceived risk for an end to the relationship (Vandell & Bailey, 1992). 
Compared to peers and friends, conflicts in the home with siblings are more intense, often 
lack reasoning and are more likely to lead to aggression (e.g., Laursen & Adams, 2018; 
Laursen, Finkelstein, & Betts, 2001). Thus, it is unsurprising that the present study found 
results supporting this relationship difference similar to Recchia et al. (2013). During this 
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age period of middle childhood to adolescence, one’s reasons for engaging in harmful 
and helpful behaviours seem to reflect a stronger investment in friendships to maintain 
harmony compared to familial relationships. Indeed, among our participants, harm 
against friends was described as more unintentional and more other-focused for helping 
behaviour compared to these same narratives with family. As children age, relationships 
within the family – specifically sibling relationships – become more egalitarian with 
support and intimacy (e.g., Buhrmester, 1992; Kim, McHale, Osgood, & Crouter, 2006). 
Therefore, it would be interesting to compare narratives about past (im)moral behaviour 
with family and friends across the lifespan. It is probable that one’s understanding of 
harmful and helpful actions with family versus friends will converge with age such that 
reasons for these behaviours will be similar regardless of the relationship. Nevertheless, it 
is also important for future research to keep in mind the quality and closeness of family 
relationships compared to friendships when examining these types of narratives across 
the lifespan.   
Age-Related Changes in Narrative Accounts of Harmful and Helpful Actions  
Our findings suggested two important age-related changes in children’s and 
adolescents’ narrative accounts of harmful and helpful actions that confirm well-
established developmental trends in the narrative field (e.g., Krettenauer & Mosleh, 2013; 
Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010b; Recchia et al., 2013, 2015). Firstly and unsurprisingly, 
physical forms of harm and help were described most in the youngest age group (middle 
childhood) and appeared to decrease with age. On the other hand, psychological forms of 
harm and help were described more often in the two older age groups (early adolescence 
and mid-adolescence) compared to the youngest age group. Therefore, experiences of 
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help and harm became less physically based and more psychologically based from middle 
childhood to adolescence. This pattern was the same for events with the family and with 
friends.  
Similar to Krettenauer and Mosleh (2013), Pasupathi and Mansour (2006), and 
Recchia et al. (2015), the extent to which participants connected their past experience to 
their current sense of self increased with age. In fact, no self-event connection or 
dismissal decreased with age, while both types of explicit confirming and explicit 
changing self-event connection increased with age (see Figure 5). Moreover, the present 
study adds a unique contribution to the literature given the specificity in our findings 
related to the increase in self-event connection with age. In particular, with age, 
participants reported higher levels of past helpful events explicitly confirming their self-
view, while also reporting a greater degree of past harmful events explicitly changing 
their self-view. These findings are also consistent with Pasupathi et al. (2015) who found 
that participants drew more growth conclusions (i.e., positive perceived changes in one’s 
understanding of the self and the world) in perpetrator narratives wherein the participant 
harmed another person. This makes sense given that individuals may ruminate or dwell 
more on their past moral failures compared to their moral achievements and thus desire to 
actively reflect on and make sense of how the past moral wrongdoing shapes or affects 
how they see themselves and how they want to be in the future. From a developmental 
perspective, with age, individuals may seek to integrate and connect their past 
experiences and reflect on how those experiences shape their current self: What has led 
me to be who I am today? How am I different or the same after this happened? It is well 
known that individuals desire a sense of connection over time between past experiences 
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and present concerns and future goals that ultimately shape their identity (e.g., Erikson, 
1959/1980; McAdams, 2001; McLean & Pasupathi, 2012). 
In addition to the difference in self-event connection coding between Recchia et 
al. (2015) and the present study, perhaps Recchia et al. (2015) found more self-event 
connections in youth’s help narratives than in harm narratives because they did not 
distinguish between explicit confirming and explicit changing self-event connections in 
their coding. Again, contrary to Proulx and Chandler (2009), there does not seem to be a 
general developmental trend towards increased multiplicity and context-dependency in 
one’s self-constructions to imagine one’s bad behaviours as externally provoked and 
good behaviours as internally motivated. If older participants were better able to 
externalize their immoral behaviours, as Proulx and Chandler (2009) proposed, we would 
not have found age-related differences in the explicit self-event connections for both 
harmful and helpful actions. Therefore, even in the harmful context, older participants 
take on a sense of moral responsibility and were able to connect their past wrongdoing to 
their current self by changing one’s self-view rather than blaming their wrongdoing on 
external reasons.  
These age differences, as well as individual differences, in self-event connection 
may be linked to larger developmental gains, as outlined by Pasupathi and Mansour 
(2006). Pasupathi and Mansour (2006) examined self-event connections in important 
non-specific life narratives and suggested the adaptive nature of these connections given 
the potential gains in mental and physical health, as well as interpersonal benefits. In 
terms of the moral domain and reflecting on past (im)moral behaviour, these age-related 
differences could also demonstrate developmental gains in the health and interpersonal 
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areas. For example, a past moral event confirming one’s self-view may lead to greater 
personal well-being and enhanced self-worth given that the past behaviour aligns with 
one’s current moral values. At the same time, a past immoral event changing one’s self-
view may lead to self-transformation (see Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006) given that self-
event connection might be similar to coherent positive resolution, which has also been 
coded for in life narratives. Coherent positive resolution is seen as a type of 
transformational processing as one reflects on the past event and creates a sense of 
change in one’s self, which is also central to one’s narrative identity (see Pals, 2006). 
This type of processing has been associated with greater emotional well-being, including 
higher levels of optimism and lower levels of depressive symptoms, compared to those 
who exhibited less coherent positive resolution in their narratives (Dumas, Lawford, 
Tieu, & Pratt, 2009).  
Evidently, future research needs to continue examining self-event connections in 
narratives about past experiences across the lifespan to better delineate age as well as 
context effects, while also exploring its relation to well-being and behaviour. The ability 
to form self-event connections is an important mechanism of identity development, 
specifically the development of the third layer of personality. By reflecting on past 
(im)moral actions, it contributes to moral identity development and how one may view 
morality as imperative to their sense of self. Thus, it is also important for educators and 
parents to ensure that their children and students, especially in high school, are reflecting 
on their past moral achievements as well as moral failures to better facilitate the 
development of moral understanding and a more mature sense of moral agency. Whether 
the past moral event confirms or changes one’s self-view, it appears that with age 
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reflecting on one’s past behaviour increases the strength of self-event connection from 
merely no connection or dismissal to more explicit forms of self-event connection. 
Through these reflections, one might be better able to understand themselves and others 
in the context of how their morally laden actions go beyond the actual event itself and 
rooted in goals and beliefs. 
Limitations and Conclusions 
The present study’s overall major limitations were discussed in Chapter I (i.e., 
cross-sectional design, limited age-range, public versus catholic school boards, 
predominately European-descent sample), but there are some specific limitations related 
to this study. Given the narrative nature of the study, selection bias in the events that 
participants chose to narrate was a possibility, though social desirability does not seem to 
play a large role in explaining age and context differences in observed patterns in these 
types of data (see Recchia et al., 2015; Wainryb et al., 2005). Moreover, we cannot 
generalize these findings across different relationships. For instance, future research 
should examine whether these harmful and helpful experiences with a parent, sibling, 
best friend(s), and other friends or peers would change the pattern of effects. Finally, the 
study was correlational in nature and we cannot draw any causal conclusions. For 
example, physical forms of harm decreased with age which could suggest that 
participants engaged in less physical forms of harm over time or it could also suggest that 
older participants were less likely to discuss physical forms of harm. At the same time, 
other factors altogether, such as social conventions and past consequences of physical 
forms of harm, might explain why this type of harm decreased across middle childhood 
and adolescence. 
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Despite the limitations, the present study adds an important contribution to the 
literature by considering similarities and differences between transgressive and prosocial 
experiences separately for family and friends when examining narrative accounts of past 
morally relevant experiences. Importantly, these findings related to context and age were 
not only statistically significant, but also had practical significance given that the effect 
sizes (Cohen’s d) were mainly medium to large. Practically, this means that the way 
children and adolescents understand and interpret past morally relevant events depend on 
the moral and/or social context of the situation, as well as changes with age. By 
comparing the effect sizes of social context (e.g., reasons x social, h2p = .10) and moral 
context (reasons x moral, h2p = .90), it appeared that the moral context was more 
important than the social context in how children and adolescents reason and connect to 
past morally relevant behaviour. Most importantly, this study has the potential to inform 
parents, educators, and future research on ways to help support moral identity 
development, specifically their moral understanding of the self and therefore, others. 
Across all ages, parents and educators need to encourage their children and students to 
actively reflect on their past moral and immoral behaviour given that they gain different 
insights about themselves in each of these moral contexts. By gaining greater insight on 
the self as a moral person through active reflection, hopefully we can enrich these moral 
citizens to engage together in a more compassionate and caring world. 
CHAPTER IV: Relationships Between the Three Layers of Moral Identity 
The focus of each chapter of this dissertation has been one of three layers of 
moral identity, but how do these layers of moral identity relate to each other? Bivariate 
MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT                                                                     93 
correlations between key study variables of each layer of moral identity were examined, 
controlling for age given that there were age-related differences at each layer (see Table 
19). After controlling for age, similar to Krettenauer and Victor (2017), the first layer of 
moral identity (mean-level of self-importance of moral values) was positively and 
marginally significantly related to internal moral identity motivation at the second layer, 
r(183) = .14, p = .061. It is important to note that although the relationship between 
mean-level of moral identity (layer one) and internal moral identity motivation (layer 
two) was marginally significant, it is consistent and similar in strength (r = .14) to 
Krettenauer and Victor’s (2017) finding with a larger sample of adolescents and adults. 
The second layer of moral identity motivation was also significantly related to the third 
layer of moral identity, such that internal moral identity motivation was positively related 
to strength of self-event connection, r(183) = .18, p = .017. The first layer and third layer 
of moral identity were unrelated, r(183) = .09, ns. Evidently, there was a substantial 
relationship between the second and third layers of moral identity, and a marginal 
relationship between the first and second layers. Finally, supporting previous research 
connecting moral identity to moral behaviour (see Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016), the three 
layers of moral identity seem to be related to moral behaviour, specifically antisocial 
behaviour. These follow-up analyses support the notion that there are three layers to 
moral identity given that they appear to be somewhat related to one another as well as to 
moral behaviour.  
Although these effect sizes were small (r’s = .14 and .18), they allude to some 
important theoretical and practical significance. In terms of developmental theory, this 
was the first study to examine moral identity development, especially the three layers, 
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prior to adolescence and the findings suggest that layers of moral identity are present and 
already appear to relate to each other in younger developmental age periods, which is 
worth studying. From middle childhood to adolescence, individuals are becoming more 
self-aware of their moral understanding while also navigating new experiences, new 
environments, and new friendships. As such, aspects or layers of their identity may be 
more related than others, especially in terms of their motivations (i.e., why they want to 
be this way or why they engage in specific behaviours) and the ability to draw 
connections to past experiences to their current sense of self (i.e., confirming versus 
changing one’s self-view). As individuals enter adulthood and become less differentiated 
and more integrated with their sense of self across contexts, these layers might become 
more related to each other. Evidently, future research is needed that examines these 
layers of moral identity across middle childhood to adulthood. Practically, the findings 
also suggest that it might be worth pursing interventions to further enhance these layers 
by emphasizing environments that both foster internal motivation and stress the 
importance of active reflection of past (im)moral actions. Despite the small effect size, 
the relationship between these layers is present and it is continuously important to 
contribute to developmental theory as well as to pursue ways to foster moral 
understanding and moral citizens.  
The trait layer of moral identity, however, seemed to be the most different layer of 
moral identity compared to the motivation and narrative layers. This was especially 
apparent when comparing age-related patterns across the three layers and only the first 
layer exhibited a decline in moral identity (i.e., self-importance of moral values) in terms 
of traits, whereas the other two layers exhibited general positive increases with age. 
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Moreover, the trait layer was not as strongly related to the other layers. There are a 
number of potential explanations for the variation in the trait layer compared to the 
motivation and narrative layers of moral identity.  
First, the decline in the self-importance of moral values could indicate a 
transformation in identity formation in the adolescent years. Identity development may 
not be as linear at the trait layer given that there are fluctuations in identity and it 
continues to develop throughout the lifespan. Erikson (1968, 1980) was the first to 
conceptualize identity as a multidimensional construct and given developmental changes 
and transitions in environment, an individual’s identity is subject to both change and 
transformation. This meaningful notion can also be applied to moral identity 
development. Marcia (1966) built on Erikson’s model of identity and outlined two key 
identity processes described by Erikson that could be used in empirical research: identity 
exploration and identity commitment. These processes led to the creation of Marcia’s 
identity statuses based on the level of exploration and commitment (for an overview, see 
Luyckx, Schwartz, Goossens, Beyers, & Missotten, 2011; Schwartz, Donnellan, Ravert, 
Luyckz, & Zamboanga, 2013). Based on their research program, Meeus and colleagues 
(e.g., Crocetti, Rubini, & Meeus, 2008; Meeus, van de Schoot, Keijsers, Schwartz, & 
Branje, 2010) argued that individuals enter adolescence with a more foreclosed identity 
status (high commitment, low exploration) with commitments internalized from parents 
and these commitments can be reassessed as part of the process in becoming more 
autonomous and one developing their own identity separate from their parents. In 
particular, “during adolescence, individuals manage their commitments in two ways: 
through in-depth exploration and through reconsideration [of commitments]” (Meeus et 
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al., 2010, p. 1567). In a large longitudinal study spanning throughout adolescence, Meeus 
et al. (2010) found various identity progression as well as identity regression transitions, 
which indicates that adolescents may reconsider commitments, while considering 
alternative ones. Interestingly, they also found that the “early closure/closure” identity 
status (similar to foreclosure) was the most prevalent status in the sample, again 
providing evidence that individuals entering adolescence have a more foreclosed status 
compared to later age groups.  
In line with this view, the personality trait of openness tends to increase during 
the transition to adulthood (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006), which suggests the 
allowance for more identity exploration during this time period (Schwartz et al., 2013). 
Children and early adolescents may appear to have a foreclosed identity, reflecting higher 
scores in mean-level of self-importance of moral values (layer one). As they move 
through adolescence into adulthood they likely engage in a more moratorium identity 
status (high exploration, low commitment) as they navigate new environments and social 
situations (e.g., high school, university), which may result in temporarily lower identity 
commitment and thus lower scores in mean-level of moral identity. Adolescence is also a 
developmental period wherein individuals become more social and more sensitive to 
social inclusion (e.g., Brown, 2004; Mrazek, Harada, & Chiao, 2015; Steinberg & Morris, 
2001). With the added social pressures, their sense of identity is likely fluctuating with 
greater degrees of exploration and a temporary decline in commitment as they try to 
understand themselves and become their own person. The above research on identity 
exploration and commitment point to the conception that at the trait layer, there may not 
be a continuous linear increase in identity commitment and thus mean-level of moral 
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identity may also fluctuate over the lifespan, especially from childhood to adulthood. 
Unfortunately, there has yet to be longitudinal research examining how these processes in 
identity formation appear prior to adolescence and a more lifespan approach is needed.  
Another possible explanation for why the trait layer of moral identity exhibited 
different patterns than both the motivation and narrative layers of moral identity could be 
that the general importance of values and traits may not take fruition until adolescence 
and adulthood, as traditional identity theorists suggest. In childhood, there could be a lack 
of connection between abstract value attributes and their own motivations and interests, 
and as such, mean-level of traits may not be adequately present in younger developmental 
periods. Children are able to communicate their reasons and motivations, and are able to 
reflect on past behaviour (layer two and layer three of moral identity), but these may not 
yet be coherently linked to how they view themselves in terms of traits. For example, 
children know they like to be honest and not lie because it allows others to view them 
more positively, but they may not have explicitly connected this to their general sense of 
self as an honest person. Therefore, mean-level of moral identity as reflected at the trait 
layer of personality may not yet be directly connected to the other two layers. In fact, 
when examining mean-level change in personality traits, Roberts et al. (2006) concluded 
that mean-level change in traits is more prevalent in young adulthood than in adolescence 
(except for openness which increases in adolescence), though they did not have children 
in their study nor did they examine moral attributes.  
Finally, we cannot rule out that it could be a methodological issue when 
examining the self-importance of moral values given that this approach has not been 
conducted with samples younger than adolescence. It is also important to note that unlike 
MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT                                                                     98 
Krettenauer et al. (2016), we did not provide our sample with a choice to choose which 
moral attributes they considered as descriptive of a highly moral person. Perhaps if our 
younger sample was able to select their own moral attributes that resonated with them, 
our findings may be different. At the same time, the developmental age period itself may 
be attributable to explain the results at the trait layer of moral identity given that the 
positivity bias or self-serving bias has been documented to be especially salient from ages 
8- to 11-years-old (for an overview, see Trzesniewski et al., 2011). When examining 
children’s moral self-concept, Krettenauer and colleagues (2013) found a decrease in the 
moral self with age from 5- to 12-years-old, which again could suggest the positivity bias 
inherent with the younger sample.  
It is apparent that a more lifespan view of moral identity development at all three 
layers needs to be further explored in theory and in data collection to better understand 
how each layer develops over time and are related to each other from childhood to 
adulthood. Moral identity development is likely not linear at all layers given that identity 
commitment changes qualitatively with greater in-depth exploration and reconsideration 
of commitments occurring in the adolescent years prior to adulthood. It is also reasonable 
to believe that the layers become increasingly related throughout the lifespan. 
General Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Moral psychology has questioned the nature of human morality and its 
development, as well as searched for explanations for why individuals behave morally. 
Blasi’s (1980, 1983, 1984) introduction of moral identity as an explanatory construct to 
understanding moral development has shaped the empirical landscape in this area for the 
last several decades. Throughout the hundreds of published articles following Blasi’s 
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work, moral identity has been recognised as an important development dimension, but 
there has been a lack of documented systematic developmental trends on the construct. 
The leading two approaches to studying moral identity, trait-based and sociocognitive, 
arguably do not place development at the forefront and heavily rely on a single layer of 
personality description (for an overview, see Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). The 
personological approach, on the other hand, provides a rich source for studying moral 
identity development across the lifespan and includes the three layers important to 
studying moral personality and development (see Pratt & Hardy, 2014; Walker, 2014). 
Identity is more complex than simply traits or schema formation and action, and thus can 
be differentiated into multiple layers with varying age-related patterns.  
While this integrative approach is promising and evidence has suggested 
developmental changes on these layers (predominately with adolescents and adults) (see 
Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015), no single empirical investigation has investigated age-related 
patterns on all three layers. At the same time, it is important to address what Nucci (2004) 
identified as a major weakness of research on moral identity and focus on the 
understudied developmental period of middle childhood to adolescence. The vast 
majority of moral identity research centres on adolescence and emerging adulthood given 
that it has been deemed the “critical developmental period” of identity formation (e.g., 
Hardy & Carlo, 2011b). Arguably, identity, and more specifically moral identity, is a 
lifelong process that is not exclusive to adolescence and beyond (e.g., Damon, 1996; 
Krettenauer et al., 2016), especially given the evidence of the moral self in childhood.  
 The present dissertation aimed to better understand how the multifaceted concept 
of moral identity develops across the lifespan. Given research by Krettenauer and 
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colleagues (2016, 2017, in press), moral identity can be described as a context-dependent 
self-structure that develops across the lifespan from adolescence to adulthood. However, 
what about its development prior to adolescence? More specifically, the main research 
question of this dissertation was: how does moral identity form in the course of individual 
development during middle childhood to adolescence?  
 Chapter I focused on the first layer of moral identity (traits) and was the first of its 
kind to examine mean-level and cross-context differentiation of moral identity across 
middle childhood and adolescence. Participants were asked to rate the self-importance of 
13-value attributes that were most frequently chosen by the youngest adolescent age 
group in Krettenauer et al.’s (2016) study that described a highly moral person. 
Participants rated these value attributes separately for the social contexts most relevant to 
this developmental age period: family, friends, and school. Age-related patterns were 
found on this layer of moral identity with mean-level of moral identity (averaged across 
all three contexts) decreasing with age, while cross-context differentiation increased with 
age. Moreover, similar to previous research, parental support was a positive predictor of 
moral identity above and beyond social desirability, age, and parent-child negative 
interactions.  
 Chapter II centred on the second layer of moral identity (motivations) by asking 
participants to elaborate on the moral attributes they identified as extremely important to 
the self in the procedure described in Chapter I. As expected, moral identity motivation 
varied by both age and social context. Consistent with Self-Determination Theory (see 
Deci & Ryan, 2012), external moral identity motivation and relationship-oriented moral 
identity motivation decreased with age, while internal moral identity motivation 
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increased with age. In line to what previous research suggests, this second layer of moral 
identity was indeed context-specific such that rates of internal, external, and relationship-
oriented moral identity motivation depended on whether the context was family, friends, 
or school. For instance, external moral identity motivation was highest in the school 
context compared to the family and friends contexts, while internal moral identity 
motivation was most salient in the contexts of family and friends. This layer of moral 
identity was also predictive of moral behaviour, specifically those reporting higher levels 
of internal moral identity motivation had lower levels of teacher-reported antisocial 
behaviour.   
 Chapter III addressed the third layer of moral identity by focusing on narrative 
accounts of past moral failures (harming others) and past moral achievements (helping 
others) in the context of family and friends. This approach was different from past 
narrative studies because this was the first study to empirically examine both types of 
moral contexts (transgressive, prosocial) as well as social contexts (family, friends) to 
better understand how children’s and adolescents’ descriptions and interpretations of their 
past morally relevant events connect to their current sense of self. As expected, results 
indicated age-related patterns in the ability to connect past experiences to one’s present 
sense of self by either confirming or changing one’s self-view. This chapter also 
illuminated meaningful asymmetries in children’s and adolescents’ experiences and 
interpretations of past (im)moral actions that also depend on the social context. For 
example, reasons for engaging in behaviour were different for past harmful and helpful 
behaviours with more emphasis on self-oriented reasons in the harmful context and more 
other-oriented reasons in the helpful context. Moreover, reflecting on past harmful 
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actions led to more self-event connections compared to past helpful actions. This chapter 
importantly added validity to this narrative method given that children and adolescents 
were able to differentiate and be responsive to the separate contexts.  
 Overall, the separate analyses of the three research topics (traits, motivations, and 
narratives) described in the chapters provide concrete evidence for utilizing the 
personological approach to moral identity development. In his commentary to 
Krettenauer and Hertz (2015), Lapsley (2015) was concerned about the degree to which 
the personological approach yields developmental potential and that it “still requires 
developmental specification. It still needs to show how developmental processes in 
childhood influence the trajectory of moral identity in adolescence and adulthood” (p. 
169). This dissertation addresses Lapsley’s concern – albeit through a cross-sectional 
design – by providing empirical age-related patterns at each layer of moral identity 
outlined in the personological approach. This innovative inclusive methodology that 
expands the scope of inquiry of moral identity development is necessary to take the field 
to a higher, more sophisticated level of moral psychology that reflects the multifaceted 
construct of moral identity. In the following sections, implications of the dissertation 
research will be considered in order to facilitate future research in the area.  
Moving Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Moral Identity Development 
Identity development is shaped by macro-level and micro-level factors including 
but not limited to, culture, history, and individual differences in characteristics; arguably 
researchers need to consider the multiple layers of individuality when examining how 
identity develops (for an overview, see Schwartz et al., 2013). Consequently, the current 
dissertation aimed to utilize the personological approach to study moral identity 
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development that draws upon the personality framework of McAdams (2009). This more 
integrative and heuristic approach allows researchers to distinguish between these layers 
of individuality and examine the developmental nature of moral identity. In Lapsley’s 
(2015) commentary to Krettenauer and Hertz’s (2015) critical review of moral identity 
development, he noted that “What we have not done is the hard work of articulating a 
theory of development that yields moral identity (even as life story narratives) as an 
outcome” (p. 168). Moreover, Nucci (2004) pointed out that “perhaps the biggest gap in 
theory is the paucity of explanatory connection between children’s morality and the 
period of early adolescence when the construction of moral identity is presumed to exert 
its influence on moral responsibility” (p. 123). As the first systematic investigation into 
the three layers of moral identity, I would like to propose in the following paragraphs a 
more comprehensive theory of moral identity development based on our findings and in 
response to both Lapsley and Nucci.  
The self becomes increasingly involved in morality and moral action across the 
lifespan and thus is not limited to older developmental periods. This dissertation provides 
evidence in contrast to the Eriksonian perspective stating that only adolescents are 
capable to construct a sense of identity given the cognitive limitations (for an overview, 
see Kroger, 2007). Now that it is evident that there are three layers to moral identity 
similar to personal identity (see Schwartz et al., 2013), it is important to keep in mind that 
“some aspects of morality are in place both before and after adolescence” (Heiphetz, 
Strohminger, Gelman, & Young, 2018, p. 2). Specifically, layers of moral identity may 
differentially appear before and after adolescence and become increasingly connected 
throughout the lifespan. At some point in adulthood, these layers of moral identity will be 
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integrated into an individual’s moral identity as a whole, similar to Damon’s (1984) 
conception of moral systems being integrated into one’s sense of self by adulthood. 
In order to better articulate this new general perspective of how moral identity 
may manifest from middle childhood to adolescence, let us compare a moral identity in 
middle childhood versus a moral identity in the adolescent years. Before we compare, in 
middle childhood, individuals are more accurate in their self-appraisals given advances in 
their cognitive ability to (1) appreciate negative and positive attributes, (2) use social 
comparisons for their own self-evaluation, (3) differentiate between real versus ideal self-
perceptions, as well as (4) enhanced perspective-taking skills that can directly impact 
one’s own self-perception to be more realistic (see Harter, 2012). Thus, these cognitive-
developmental advances as well as their increased self-awareness, self-agency, and self-
continuity (for an overview, see Harter, 2012) make it appropriate for us to discuss and 
use the concept of moral “identity” prior to adolescence. It is, however, important to keep 
in mind that there are restrictions and identity may appear differently from middle 
childhood to adolescence.  
The moral identity of a 10-year-old consists of a high degree of self-importance of 
moral values (layer one), but their self-view as a moral person appears to be more 
externally or relationship driven (layer two) and there is also less self-relevance of past 
moral actions (layer three). Individuals in middle childhood appear to have a strong sense 
of self, but this self-view is more “external” and reflective of their parental values and 
nurturing rather than a purely personal “internal” self-view. Scholars in identity research 
might be reluctant to believe that identity begins forming in childhood, but it is 
reasonable that by middle childhood, children may have a developing moral identity that 
MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT                                                                     105 
is more reflective of a social moral identity. This social moral identity is based on the 
desire to be the type of person who is considered a valued member of one’s community 
(family, friends, school), beyond simply having a good relationship with one’s parents. 
The need for a sense of belonging in one’s environment is still a priority with social 
comparisons for self-evaluation occurring naturally for this age period. For example, 
Bryan, Master, and Walton (2014) found that children (3- and 6-year-olds) were 
motivated to pursue a positive identity given that participants who were encouraged to 
“be a helper” (noun condition) helped more than participants encouraged “to help” (verb 
condition). The noun condition appeared to invoke a perceived valued identity that 
actually fostered helping behaviour. Bryan et al. (2014) argued that adults may 
involuntarily or straightforwardly signal to children the behaviours and values that are 
more relevant to defining their identity and that are also valued by adults. As such, we 
propose that an individual’s social moral identity in middle childhood is likely consistent 
with one’s self-view (e.g., attributes you have) but is also highly valued in social contexts 
(e.g., attributes that your parents and friends also value) and thus not a fully autonomous 
identity.  
The moral identity of a 16-year-old, on the other hand, has a lower level of self-
importance of moral values (layer one) as the adolescent is likely reconsidering their 
identity commitments derived from their parents, while also experiencing in-depth 
identity exploration as they enter new environments (e.g., high school). However, the 16-
year-old’s moral identity appears to be moving towards a more personal, autonomous, 
and internalized sense of identity with a greater degree of both internal identity 
motivation (layer two) as well as greater self-relevance of past moral behaviour (layer 
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three). Consequently, compared to the 16-year-old, the 10-year-old’s moral identity does 
not appear to have an internal mechanism to drive their behaviour, but rather a desire to 
be a valued member in their community of family, friends, teachers, peers, and 
neighbours. In other words, moral identity may be more socially driven in middle 
childhood and progresses to be more autonomous with age. Our view certainly aligns 
with the well-established developmental research that suggests, especially at the trait 
layer, identity is largely shaped during the transition period from adolescence to 
adulthood through socialization as well as through the incorporation of self-definitions 
that an individual attaches to themselves (e.g., Harter, 2012; Mead, 1934). Initially in 
childhood and early adolescence, one’s sense of identity forms based on feelings of 
belonging and commitment, as well as attitudes and values that are shared by both the 
self and others’ in one’s social group (see Mrazek et al., 2015; Phinney, 1990). At some 
point during the transition to adulthood, with adequate in-depth exploration and 
reconsideration, individuals are able to formulate their own sense of identity based on 
what is most important and most fulfilling to the self. 
Past research (e.g., Kochanska et al., 2002, 2010; Krettenauer, 2018; Krettenauer 
et al., 2013) has argued that young children’s moral self-concept may be a precursor to 
later moral identity, but here we argue that young children’s moral self-concept may lead 
to a social moral identity in middle childhood, which continues to be more autonomous 
with age forming a more fully internal moral identity during the transition to adulthood. 
In light of Lapsley’s (2015) request for a theory of development that yields moral identity 
as an outcome (e.g., life narratives), this dissertation leads us to consider the strength of 
the relationship between layers of moral identity as the overall outcome or indicator of a 
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personal, autonomous and thus mature moral identity. From a developmental and 
theoretical perspective, it is too simple to claim a specific layer of moral identity as the 
outcome given that human development itself (including personality) is complex and thus 
its explanations and outcomes are as well. Based on this dissertation, the most important 
theoretical implication is that in order to fully understand and describe moral identity, we 
need to consider all three layers and how they interact together over time to formulate a 
cohesive and “complete” moral identity that may first emerge as a social moral identity in 
middle childhood and later develops into a more autonomous, internalized moral identity. 
Over the lifespan, these layers of moral identity are differentially developing and 
continue to develop to be more internalized and reflect a more personal identity. Once the 
trait layer, motivation and goal-oriented layer, as well as narrative layer of moral identity 
are strongly connected, and thus integrated, we can conclude that one’s moral identity has 
reached maturity. Empirically, researchers may examine each layer of moral identity as 
an indicator of moral identity similar to Chapters I, II, and III, but it would be premature 
to state that moral identity is simply only traits, or motivations, or narratives. By 
connecting the layers, we are able to provide a more complete perspective on moral 
identity and how it develops over time. It is important to note that these layers are not 
meant to be outlined as stages to moral identity development. Instead, this more 
comprehensive theory of moral identity development suggests that it is a multifaceted, 
context-dependent construct and its development occurs throughout the course of the 
lifespan beginning with a more social moral identity in middle childhood that becomes 
more internal and autonomous over time.  
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Future Directions 
 As discussed above, the present dissertation has many implications related to 
moral identity as a construct (three layers) as well as its development from middle 
childhood to adolescence. This dissertation may serve as a springboard for the many 
research investigations that will come to further test the aforementioned theory of moral 
identity. First, researchers need to continue this line of work across the lifespan without 
limiting the scope exclusively to adolescents and adults. It is important to also 
acknowledge that this dissertation project utilized a cross-sectional design and thus we 
cannot make conclusive general claims about “development”. These age-related patterns 
across the age groups may also be attributable to other factors other than age, such as 
sample characteristics and thus we need to be cautious on how to generalize these age 
patterns until longitudinal investigations have been conducted. At the same time, 
Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) view that identity is a result of one’s interactions across 
different levels of ecosystems in their environment from the personal and most intimate 
ecological system (the microsystem consisting of family, friends, school) to the broader 
cultural and societal ecological system (the macrosystem), which need to be considered 
in any investigations examining identity. Additionally, the bi-directional influence that 
personal relationships at the microsystem level has on the individual is important to 
consider. For example, the family can influence the child’s behaviour and development, 
but the child’s reactions to and interactions with the family also influences how the 
family interacts with the child. It would be vital to consider how the influences that go 
back and forth shape moral identity development. 
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Context-specificity needs to be part of the research design regardless of 
developmental age period because even at a young age, there is context-dependency in 
how children reflect and understand the self and the world (i.e., family, friends, school, 
immoral context, moral context). Recent work in the field has taken into account various 
moral and social contexts (e.g., Krettenauer et al., 2016; Krettenauer & Victor, 2017; 
Recchia et al., 2013, 2015), though not systematically in a single study like the present 
dissertation project. Expanding the dimension of context-specificity is also needed in 
empirical investigations to better reflect the complexity of human development across the 
different ecological systems given that these systems naturally interact with and influence 
one another. For instance, findings from this dissertation cannot be generalized to all 
cultural contexts especially given that there are culturally specific conceptions of moral 
identity (see Jia et al., in press). The present study needs to be replicated in other cultural 
contexts to better understand how moral identity develops cross-culturally 
(macrosystem). Finally, given the implications for moral education in how educators and 
parents can foster moral understanding and moral behaviour, as well as the difference in 
the school systems (e.g., Kelly, 2010), future research needs to also differentiate the 
school context by examining students in public versus catholic schools (macrosystem). 
The present study recruited participants from both school systems, but the number of 
participants from catholic schools were too few (approximately 23% of the sample) to 
adequately compare both school systems. Evidently, another layer of human complexity 
needs to be considered to better understand how moral identity develops; more 
specifically, the cultural context (Western versus Eastern) and school context (public 
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versus catholic) may influence the development of these layers of moral identity in 
important and diverse ways.  
 Although it is ideal to investigate all three layers together when examining moral 
identity development, it may be challenging to incorporate all three layers of moral 
identity into a single empirical investigation depending on the resources available to 
researchers. However, as a recommendation from a developmental perspective, 
researchers at the very least need to consider the second layer of moral identity as 
imperative to examine for two reasons. First, internal moral identity motivation reflected 
in the second layer of moral identity was the strongest link to moral behaviour and 
finding ways to continue to foster this layer of moral identity is needed to promote higher 
rates of moral acts and lower incidences of immoral events. At the same time, human 
beings all have motivations or reasoning for their behavior, which can be tapped into 
from at a relatively young age. Therefore, in terms of methodological consistency over 
time, scholars need to examine one’s intentions in order to better understand their sense 
of self. This type of focus will allow developmental researchers to better compare age 
trends across the lifespan given that at most ages, individuals can articulate their reasons, 
which we now know are context-specific. 
 Finally, this dissertation proposed that moral identity development may appear as 
a social moral identity in middle childhood that progresses to be more internal with age, 
but this has not been supported by empirical evidence. In the present dissertation, 
external moral identity motivation and relationship-oriented moral identity motivation 
could be considered indicators of “social moral identity”, but future research should also 
incorporate methods to better access social moral identity to determine if this is indeed 
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present in middle childhood. For example, future research could interview children and 
adolescents and ask them how their sense of identity or the self-importance of moral 
values may or may not impact close relationships in their own lives (e.g., What if your 
friends did not think these were important? How would that impact how you see these 
values for yourself?). This type of procedure may allow researchers to assess whether 
participants’ moral identity is reflective of a social identity to uphold close relationships. 
Relatedly, Heiphetz et al. (2018) found that perceptions of friendship change may play an 
important role in perceived identity change and that changes in identity are likely linked 
to changes in relationships. Therefore, it might be meaningful to also ask participants if 
the values of their friends and family changed, how would that impact their own self-
view?  
Overall, in order for research in this area to continue to expand and add to the 
theory of moral identity development, the following need to be accomplished: (1) 
longitudinal designs from childhood to adulthood, (2) including measures that tap into 
each layer of moral identity assessed at each time point to track the trajectories across and 
within layers, and (3) examine environmental factors such as parent-child relationship 
quality as well as parental values at the onset. These types of empirical investigations will 
allow researchers to better test this developmental theory of moral identity. At the very 
least, these results provide promising directions for future research in the area.   
Conclusion 
 
 In summary, this dissertation provides the first comprehensive set of findings in 
support of important developmental changes at each of the three layers of moral identity 
across middle childhood and adolescence. Based on the empirical evidence from the 
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chapters described above, a more comprehensive theory of moral identity development 
was proposed suggesting that moral identity development is context-dependent and that 
each layer of moral identity manifests differentially throughout the lifespan. Importantly, 
it begins to emerge in middle childhood perhaps as a social moral identity and progresses 
to be more internal with age. 
 Traits (layer one) may not be ready to be fully formed yet in middle childhood, but 
warm and supportive parent-child relationships seem to nurture higher levels of moral 
identity from middle childhood to adolescence. Parents may shape children to have a 
strong social moral identity, which may later manifest into a more internalized moral 
identity. Also, given the moderate relationship between the self-importance of moral 
values (layer one) and internal moral identity motivation (layer two), perhaps by 
enhancing children’s internal moral motivation we may be able to nurture developing 
moral traits in adolescence and thus allow it to be further enriched in adulthood. Another 
way to promote internal motivation in order to support the self-importance of moral 
values in the future is for children to engage in reflections of their past moral and 
immoral behaviours (layer three). Both second and third layers of moral identity have 
many implications for educators and parents in understanding developmentally 
appropriate ways to promote moral understanding and thus moral behavior. For example, 
reflecting on past events can occur at most ages and educators and parents can help 
facilitate this type of reflective processing. Moreover, reflecting on both types of morally 
relevant behaviour appears to have different benefits for the development of their identity 
given that prosocial events may help to confirm their sense of self and reflecting on 
transgressive events aids in changing one’s self-view in light of a transgressive act. 
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Taken together, this dissertation suggests that there are three layers of moral 
identity that develop across the lifespan. Future theory and research on moral identity 
need to consider these three layers and that it is important and possible to nurture the 
development of each layer of moral identity beginning in middle childhood in order to 
better predict moral behaviour. In our current political global climate, it is increasingly 
important to cultivate moral citizens who are accepting and understanding of others and 
thus are more likely to disengage from immoral acts. 
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Appendix A: Social Desirability 
 
 
 
Below you find a list of statements. Please read each statement carefully and decide if that statement 
describes you or not. If it describes you, check the box for “True”; if not, check “False”.  
 
                       Yes          No 
 
Have you ever felt like saying unkind things to a person? …………………..……….......      ❒        ❒ 
 
Are you always careful about keeping your clothing neat and your room picked up? .......     ❒        ❒  
 
Do you sometimes feel like staying home from school even if you are not sick? ……......     ❒        ❒ 
 
Do you ever say anything that makes somebody else feel bad? …..………………………    ❒        ❒ 
 
Are you always polite, even to people who are not very nice? …………………………...     ❒        ❒ 
 
Sometimes, do you do things you’ve been told not to do? ……………………………......    ❒        ❒ 
 
Do you always listen to your parents? ……………………………….……………………    ❒        ❒ 
 
Do you sometimes wish you could just play around instead of having to go to school? …    ❒        ❒ 
 
Have you ever broken a rule? ……………………………………………………………..    ❒        ❒ 
 
Do you sometimes feel angry when you don’t get your way? …………………………….   ❒        ❒ 
 
Do you sometimes feel like making fun of other people? ….…………………………......    ❒        ❒ 
 
Do you always do the right things? ..………………………………………………………   ❒        ❒ 
 
Are there sometimes when you don’t like to do what your parents tell you? ………..…....   ❒        ❒ 
 
Do you sometimes get mad when people don’t do what you want them to do? ..…………   ❒        ❒ 
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Appendix B: Parent-Child Relationship Quality Questionnaire 
 
Everyone has a number of people who are important in his or her life. The following 
questions are about you and your relationship with your mother. Please tell me:  
 
 
How much do you and your mother get upset with or mad at each other? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you and your mother get on each other’s nerves? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much does your mother treat you like you’re admired and respected? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How sure are you that the relationship with your mother will last no matter what? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you play around and have fun with your mother? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you and your mother disagree and quarrel? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much does your mother help you figure out or fix things? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you and your mother get annoyed with each other’s behavior? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you share your secrets and private feelings with your mother? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much does your mother really care about you? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you and your mother argue with each other? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you and your mother hassle or nag one another? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you take care of your mother? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
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Now, let's talk about the relationship with your father.  
 
How much do you and your father get upset with or mad at each other? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you and your father get on each other’s nerves? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much does your father treat you like you’re admired and respected? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How sure are you that the relationship with your father will last no matter what? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you play around and have fun with your father? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you and your father disagree and quarrel? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much does your father help you figure out or fix things? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you and your father get annoyed with each other’s behaviour? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you share your secrets and private feelings with your father? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much does your father really care about you? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you and your father argue with each other? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you and your father hassle or nag one another? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
 
How much do you take care of your father? 
 
Little or none ------ somewhat ------ very much ------- extremely much 
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Appendix C: Teacher-Report of Moral Behaviour 
 
 Not 
True 
Sometimes 
True 
Certainly 
True 
1. Tends to react to other student’s distress 
by teasing them or making things worse.  
0 1 2 
2. Seems concerned when other students are 
distressed.  
0 1 2 
3. Is an aggressive student.  0 1 2 
4. Taunts and teases other students.  0 1 2 
5. Threatens other students.  0 1 2 
6. Is kind toward other students.  0 1 2 
7. Listens to other students. 0 1 2 
8. Compromises in conflicts with other 
students.  
0 1 2 
9. Is cooperative with other students.  0 1 2 
10. Loses temper easily in conflicts with 
other students.   
0 1 2 
11. Argues with other students.  0 1 2 
12. Is friendly toward other students.  0 1 2 
13. Annoys or irritates other students.  0 1 2 
14. Disrupts other student’s activities.  0 1 2 
15. Shows concern for moral issues (e.g., 
fairness, welfare of others). 
0 1 2 
16. Offers help or comfort when other 
students are upset.  
0 1 2 
17. Will continue to bother or hurt other 
students even when they are clearly upset.  
0 1 2 
18. Considerate of other people’s feelings.  0 1 2 
19. Often loses temper.   0 1  
20. Helpful if someone is hurt, upset, or 
feeling ill.  
0 1 2 
21. Generally not well behaved. 0 1 2 
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22. Often offers to help others (parents, 
teachers, students).   
0 1 2 
23. Often fights with other children or 
bullies them. 
0 1 2 
24. Shares readily with other students (e.g., 
books, games). 
0 1 2 
25. Often lies or cheats. 0 1 2 
26. Steals from home, school, or elsewhere. 0 1 2 
27. Kind to younger students. 0 1 2 
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Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Across Age Groups 
 
Middle Childhood 
(8-11 years) 
Early Adolescence 
(12-14 years) 
Mid-
Adolescence 
(15-17 years) Total 
n 65 68 57 190 
Male: n (%)a 26 (40.00) 38 (55.88) 25 (43.86) 89 (46.84) 
Age in years (SD) 10.11 (0.71) 13.26 (0.53) 16.00 (0.67) 13.00 (2.58) 
European Canadian: n (%)b 47 (74.60) 39 (58.20) 37 (64.91) 123 (65.78) 
Socioeconomic status (ISEI) 50.83 (17.29) 60.45 (14.43) 58.75 (15.57) 56.71 (16.26) 
Note. ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status.  
a Percentage refers to within column.  
b Total number of participants for European Canadian is n = 187 given that there are n = 3 missing data.  
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Table 2 
Results of Regression Analyses Predicting Mean-Level and Cross-Context Differentiation of Moral Identity by Age and Social 
Desirability Response Bias 
 Moral identity: Mean-level  Moral identity: Cross-context differentiation 
 Step 1 Step 2  Step 1 Step 2 
Predictors/controls β t β t  β t β t 
Age1 (Grade 7-8) -.15 -1.71+ -.05 -.53  .16 1.78+  .08  .83 
Age2 (Grade 10-11) -.30   -3.55** -.21 -2.48*  .25    2.86**  .18  2.03* 
Social desirability    .30      3.92***    -.18 -2.32* 
Ethnicitya        -.18 -2.39* 
          
DR2    .069** .078***  .048* .057** 
Note. N = 172. 
aEthnicity was only added to the main analyses with cross-context differentiation. 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10. 
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Table 3 
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Across Age Groups 
 
Middle Childhood 
(8-11 years) 
Early Adolescence 
(12-14 years) 
Mid-
Adolescence 
(15-17 years) Total 
n 65 66 57 188 
Male: n (%)a 26 (40.00) 36 (54.55) 25 (43.86) 87 (46.28) 
Age in years (SD) 10.11 (0.71) 13.26 (0.53) 16.00 (0.67) 12.99 (2.59) 
European Canadian: n (%)b 47 (74.60) 37 (56.92) 37 (64.91) 121 (65.41) 
Socioeconomic status (ISEI) 50.83 (17.29) 60.21 (14.58) 58.75 (15.57) 56.59 (16.30) 
Note. ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status.  
a Percentage refers to within column.  
b Total number of participants for European Canadian is n = 187 given that there are n = 3 missing data.  
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Table 4 
Coding Categories for Moral Identity Motivation 
Coding 
category 
Category 
group Definition  Interview example %a 
Standards and 
rules 
E Being moral based on following 
standards and rules of others.  
 “My parents raised me to be an honest, 
trustworthy, person. And I feel that it’s 
important to just live up to their standards.” 
(ID151, Grade 10, Male, 15-years-old) 
2.76 
Self-interest E Being moral is instrumental in 
staying out of trouble and/or 
gaining rewards or getting ahead 
in life. Primary motive to be 
moral is based on positive 
and/or negative consequences to 
the self.  
 “Because I don’t want to be in trouble, or get 
suspended, or go into detention, because 
you only just sit there for an hour or two.” 
(ID006, Grade 4, Male, 9-years-old) 16.74 
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Reputation E Being moral is important for leaving 
good impressions on others 
and/or avoiding bad 
impressions.  
 “I like to be known well by other people like my 
friends or family friends, so I want to be 
known as a good person when I grow up 
and they will remember me for a long time 
and they will always think of me when they 
look back through their lives.” (ID121, 
Grade 8, Male, 13-years-old) 
7.99 
Consequences-
relationships 
R Being moral is important 
establishing trust, maintaining 
good relationships with others, 
and ensuring social groups are 
functioning well.  
 “Because I would be building good relationships 
where we trust each other and we know we 
can confide in one another.” (ID147, Grade 
10, Male, 15-years-old) 
20.89 
Consequences-
others 
I Being moral is important for others’ 
well-being.  
 “Because I don't want people to feel bad or I don't 
want to hurt their feelings.” (ID044, Grade 
5, Female, 10-years-old) 
12.29 
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Fairness-related I Being moral is important so that 
everyone is treated the same 
way you want to be treated.  
 “I want to be treated that way as well. So I think 
those ones are the most important for me to 
be that way because I wouldn’t want to be 
like disrespected or not accepted.” (ID125, 
Grade 8, Female, 13-years-old) 
16.28 
Relationship 
ideals 
I Being moral is essential and 
reflective of the type of relationship 
or community one wants to have.  
 “It’ll create like a happy, loving environment…a 
happy, accepting environment having these 
three things; that’s where people would 
want to be. I want to be this way because I 
think it would build a school that I’d want 
to go to and a school I’d be happy to go to 
every day.” (ID140, Grade 10, Male, 15-
years-old) 
11.21 
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Role model I Being moral is important to set a 
good example for others and/or teach 
others about moral values. 
 “I have to be responsible because I’m the oldest 
and I have to take care and make sure I do 
the right thing. Because the younger 
students, they look up to the older students 
and if I’m not responsible, they’re not going 
to be either so I have to be that.” (ID081, 
Grade 8, Female, 13-years-old) 
4.15 
Self ideals I Being moral reflects the type of 
person one hopes to be.  
 “It’s important to me because I think it’s basically 
what every human should do, it’s not right 
if you get rid of one of these things and you 
don’t really care about your family with one 
of these traits…these are all the things that 
you should look for in a person and it seems 
just natural, just to find these qualities in a 
human being.” (ID121, Grade 8, Male, 13-
7.68 
MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT                                                                     148 
years-old) 
Note. E = external; I = internal; R = relationship-oriented 
aPercentage based on total number of coded responses (N = 651) 
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Table 5 
Means (and Standard Deviations and Ranges) for Moral Identity Motivation Category 
Groups Across Contexts 
 Context 
Motivation Family Friends School 
External .38a,x (.52, 0-2) .17b,x (.39, 0-2) .76c,x (.63, 0-2) 
Relationship-oriented .40a,x (.49, 0-1) .57b,y (.50, 0-1) .15c,y (.36, 0-1) 
Internal .90a,y (.73, 0-3) .91a,z (.75, 0-3) .78a,x (.76, 0-3) 
N = 188 
a,b,cMeans in the same row with different superscripts are significantly different (t-test, p 
< .004) 
x,y,zMeans in the same column with different superscripts are significantly different 
(pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction, p < .001) 
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Table 6 
Bivariate Correlations Between Moral Identity Motivation Category Groups Across Contexts 
 Context 
Context Family Friends School 
Family -.12E-R / -.20R-I** / -.36E-I***    
Friends .26E*** / .10R / .24I*** -.09E-R / -.49R-I** / -.19E-I*  
School .41E*** / .17R* / .32I*** .08E / .28R*** / .26I*** -.02E-R / -.16R-I* / -.51E-I*** 
Note. N’s ranged from 185 to 188 due to some missing data. Category groups of moral identity motivation: E = external; R = 
relationship=-oriented; I = internal. Coefficients along the diagonal represent correlations of category groups within contexts. 
Coefficients below the diagonal represent correlations of category groups across contexts. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. 
MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT                                                                     151 
Table 7 
Bivariate Correlations Between Study Variables and Demographic Characteristics  
 Moral Identity Motivation   Moral Behaviour 
 
External 
Relationship
-Oriented 
Internal   
Prosocial 
Behaviours 
Antisocial 
Behaviours 
Self-importance of moral values       -.04 .12  .07    .07 -.11 
Social desirability   .02 .11       -.08         -.01       -.04 
Socioeconomic status (ISEI)       -.10        -.06  .14          .08   -.15* 
Ethnicity (European  Canadian): 1 (yes), 0 (no)  .08 .05       -.04        -.06   .11 
Gender: 1 (female), 2 (male)  .03 -.08 -.08     -.22**       .25** 
Note. Moral identity motivations (external, relationship-oriented, and internal) represent overall motivation scores across all social 
contexts. ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status. N’s ranged from 170 to 189 due to some missing data. 
**p < .01, *p < .05. 
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Table 8 
Bivariate Correlations Between Study Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. External        
2. Relationship-oriented      .06       
3. Internal   -.45***  -.39***      
4. Prosocial behaviour     -.02   -.11     .17*     
5. Antisocial behaviour      .14+ .19**   -.29***   -.63***    
6. Parental support     -.09    .10     .06     .18*  .06   
7. Parent-child negative interaction      .03   -.14+     .11    -.06 -.01 -.38***  
Note. Moral identity motivations (external, relationship-oriented, and internal) represent overall motivation scores across all social 
contexts. N’s ranged from 169 to 189 due to some missing data. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10.
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Table 9 
Bivariate Correlations Between Motivation Coding Categories and Age (in years) 
 
External  
Relationship-
Oriented 
 Internal 
 
Standards 
Self-
Interest 
Reputation  
Consequences-
Relationship 
 
Consequences-
Others 
Fairness-
Related 
Relationship 
Ideals 
Role 
Model 
Self 
Ideal 
Age (in years) -.17* -.26*** .12+  -.31***  -.13+ .29*** .39*** .14+ .09 
Note. N = 188. ***p < .001, *p < .05, +p < .10. 
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Table 10 
Moral Identity Motivation by Age Group and Social Contexts: Results of Mixed-Model 
MANOVA 
 df F h2p 
Motivation  2, 181     55.72*** .38 
Context 2, 181   .25 .00 
Age group 2, 179   .45 .01 
Motivation x Age group 4, 364       9.07*** .09 
Motivation x Context 4, 179     50.86*** .53 
Age group x Context 4, 364   .43 .01 
Motivation x Age group x Context 8, 360 1.44 .03 
Note. All F-values reported are based on Pillai’s Trace test statistic given that it is 
considered the most robust. Other test statistics (Wilk’s Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, 
Roy’s Largest Root) yielded slightly different F-values for some interactions, but all p-
values reached the same level of statistical significance. ***p < .001, +p < .10.  
MORAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT                                                                     155 
Table 11 
Means (and Standard Errors) for Moral Identity Motivation by Age Group 
Motivation 
Middle Childhood 
(Grade 4/5; 9-11 
years old) 
Early Adolescence 
(Grade 7/8; 12-14 
years old) 
Mid-Adolescence 
(Grade 10/11; 15-
17 years old) 
External .17a (.14) .16a (.13) .10b (.14) 
Relationship-oriented .49a (.11)   .37a,b (.11) .25b (.11) 
Internal .13a (.19) .17a (.19) .23b (.20) 
Note. N = 187.  
a,bMeans in the same row with different superscripts indicate significant group differences 
(post-hoc Scheffé; p < .05).  
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Table 12 
Results of Regression Analyses Predicting Moral Identity Motivation by Parent-Child Relationship Quality and SES 
 External  Relationship-Oriented  Internal 
 Step 1 Step 2  Step 1 Step 2  Step 1 Step 2 
 b SE b SE  b SE b SE  b SE b SE 
Parental support -.10 .02 -.10 .02   .05 .05  .05 .05  .11 .02 .12 .02 
Parent-child negative interaction -.01 .02 -.01 .12  -.12 .05 -.12 .05  .15 .02 .16+ .02 
Socioeconomic status (ISEI)   -.10 .00    -.06 .00    .11 .00 
         
DR2 .01 .01  .02 .00  .02 .01 
Note. N = 167. ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status. +p < .10.  
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Table 13 
Results of Regression Analyses Predicting Moral Behaviour by Moral Identity Motivation, SES, and Gender 
 Prosocial Behaviour  Antisocial Behaviour 
 Step 1 Step 2  Step 1 Step 2 
 β SE β SE  β SE β SE 
External   .04 .29   .03 .28  .02 .24  .03 .23 
Relationship-oriented  -.05 .11  -.07 .11        .10 .10  .13+ .09 
Internal    .16+ .36   .13 .36    -.23** .31 -.19* .30 
Socioeconomic status (ISEI)     .03 .00      -.10 .00 
Gender     -.19* .06       .23** .05 
          
DR2    .030 .038*  .088** .068** 
Note. N = 184. ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status. **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10.  
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Table 14 
Bivariate Correlations Between Study Variables and Demographic Characteristics with Means and Standard Deviations 
 Type of harmful and helpful 
actions  Reasons for harmful or helpful actions 
 
Self-event 
connection 
 
Material Physical 
Psycho-
logical  External 
Self-
interested 
Other-
interested 
Response 
to others’ 
actions 
Un-
intentional 
 
Social   
   desirability 
.02   .02    -.07      -.00 -.16* .05  -.01 .02  .04 
SES     -.07  -.05  .17*  .02 .07 .04  -.05 .03  .17* 
            
Mean 1.02 .73 2.41  .13 1.01 1.32 1.33 .58  1.85 
SD   .93 .90 1.16  .39   .87   .75 1.01 .68  1.94 
Note. Narrative coding categories represent scores across all social (family, friends) and moral (harm, help) contexts. SES = 
socioeconomic status measured by the ISEI = International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status.  
N’s ranged from 170 to 186 due to some missing data. *p < .05. 
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Table 15 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Types of Harmful and Helpful Actions by Age 
Group 
Type 
Middle 
Childhood 
(Grade 4/5; 
9-11 years old) 
Early 
Adolescence 
(Grade 7/8; 
12-14 years old) 
Mid-
Adolescence 
(Grade 10/11; 
15-17 years old) 
Material or concrete    .95a (.90) .98a (.91) 1.14a (.99) 
Physical  1.03a (.94) .62b (.91)   .51b (.76) 
Psychological or emotional    2.03a (1.17)   2.49a,b (1.20) 2.75b (.99) 
Note. N = 186.  
a,bMeans in the same row with different superscripts indicate significant group differences 
(post-hoc Scheffé; p < .05). 
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Table 16 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Types of Harmful and Helpful Actions Across 
Moral Contexts 
Type Harmful Acts Helpful Acts 
Material or concrete   .22a,x (.46) .82b,x (.75) 
Physical   .28a,x (.50) .45b,y (.66) 
Psychological or emotional 1.52a,y (.64) .91b,x (.80) 
Note. N = 184.  
a,bMeans in the same row with different superscripts indicate significant group differences 
(t-tests; p < .003).  
x,y,zMeans in the same column with different superscripts are significantly different 
(pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction, p < .001) 
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Table 17 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Types of Harmful and Helpful Actions Across 
Social Contexts 
Type Family Friends 
Material or concrete   .63a,x (.64)   .40b,x (.55) 
Physical   .39a,y (.59)   .35a,x (.56) 
Psychological or emotional 1.19a,z (.70) 1.26a,y (.71) 
Note. N = 182. 
a,bMeans in the same row with different superscripts indicate significant group differences 
(t-tests; p < .001).  
x,y,zMeans in the same column with different superscripts are significantly different 
(pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction, p < .005) 
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Table 18 
Overall Means (and Standard Deviations) for Reasons of Harmful and Helpful Actions 
Type M SD 
External constraints  .13a   .39 
Self-interested 1.01b   .87 
Other-interested 1.32c   .75 
Response to others’ actions   1.33c,b 1.02 
Unintentional  .58d   .68 
Note. N = 186. 
a,b,c,dMeans in the same column with different superscripts are significantly different 
(pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction, p < .05) 
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Table 19 
Bivariate Correlations Between Key Variables of Each Layer of Moral Identity Controlling for Age (Zero-Order Correlations in 
Parentheses) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Mean-level of moral identity  
   (layer 1) 
      
2. Internal moral identity  
   motivation (layer 2) 
 .14+ (.04)      
3. External moral identity  
   motivation (layer 2) 
-.08 (-.03)      -.40*** (-.45***)     
4. Self-event connection  
   (layer 3) 
 .09 (-.02) .18* (.31***)   -.05 (-.13+)    
5. Prosocial behaviour    .09 (.07)        .14+ (.17*) -.00 (-.02)    .03 (.07)   
6. Antisocial behaviour -.18* (-.09) -.19* (-.29***)   .08 (.14+)  -.08 (-.19**) -.64*** (-.64***)  
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Note. Moral identity motivations (external and internal) represent overall motivation scores across all social contexts (family, friends, 
school). N’s ranged from 181 to 184 due to some missing data. Partial correlations were also performed controlling for gender and the 
coefficients were very similar and significance levels remained the same. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .10.  
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Figure 1. Diagrams of the family (blue) and friends (green) contexts to represent varying 
degrees of self-importance of moral values wherein participants placed each moral value 
label in the circle that represents its level of importance to the self.  
Not Important to Me
Somewhat Important to Me
Important to Me
Very Important to Me
Extremely 
Important to Me
Think	about	yourself:
How	important	is	it	for	you	to	be	_____	with	your	family?
Not Important to Me
Somewhat Important to Me
Important to Me
Very Important to Me
Extremely 
Important to Me
Think	about	yourself:
How	important	is	it	for	you	to	be	_____	with	your	friends?
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Figure 2. External moral identity motivation category groups across social contexts by 
age group. 
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Figure 3. Internal moral identity motivation category groups across social contexts by 
age group. 
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Figure 4. Mean scores of reasons for engaging in harmful/helpful actions by social 
contexts.  
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Figure 5. Self-event connection across social contexts and moral contexts by age group.  
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